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Which Interests Should Tort Protect?
JEAN THOMAS†
INTRODUCTION
This Article asks the question: what justifies the
practice of tort law? It asks the question with a particular
focus: which interests should tort protect? This Article
argues that tort selects and protects a determinate set of
interests, even if we do not take it to be doing so. The second
claim advanced in the Article is that tort law is constitutive
of political society in the sense that it expresses our sense of
ourselves as persons within society, and our sense of what
we owe one another. Given that tort law inevitably selects a
particular set of interests for protection, and that this
selection is politically significant in that it expresses what
we take our rights and obligations towards each other to be,
this Article argues that the interests tort selects for
protection ought to, at least presumptively, reflect the set of
interests that are enumerated in constitutions and bills of
rights—the interests that best reflect the values that
constitute our political morality. Given the fact of
reasonable moral disagreement, constitutions and bills of
rights offer the best approximation of the values to which
†Max Weber Fellow, European University Institute, jean.thomas@eui.eu
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we are fundamentally committed. To the extent that the set
of interests that tort protects is different from the set of
interests constitutionally enumerated in the form of
individual rights, tort law’s deviation from that set of
interests must be explicitly justified—current theories of
tort have not done so.
Tort law establishes the legal rights and obligations
that individuals in a society have directly to one another. It
is thus an institution that is, in some sense, both formative
and constitutive of its society. Therefore, the content of the
rights and obligations it establishes—that is to say, the
interests it protects—as well as the manner in which it
selects them, ought to be of concern not only to lawyers and
legal theorists, but also to everyone who belongs to a
society, especially lawmakers, political theorists, and
philosophers. And yet, despite a vast scholarship concerned
with the nature and justification of tort law, the question of
which interests it ought to protect has received remarkably
little attention.
Why does this question matter? Some have argued that
so-called ‘public’ interests, such as nondiscrimination and
freedoms of expression and religion, can be interpretively
folded into tort’s existing protection of material harm to the
person. One such argument is that a woman’s interest in
being free from sexual harassment, for example, can be
judicially interpreted to be included in the interest in
‘‘emotional tranquility’’—which tort does protect—through
its cause of action making the intentional infliction of
emotional distress a legal wrong.1 However, a woman who is
being viciously harassed on the street in a sexually
degrading manner may or may not find herself protected by
the police. And if such a woman wants to legally complain
about the sexual harassment by her tormentor, claiming
that he violated her as a matter of one private individual to
another, she cannot do so.2 She must instead accuse him of
disturbing her emotional tranquility—and as any woman
who has suffered such harassment knows, this does not
fully capture the nature of the act.3 Moreover, since her
1. See Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from
Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2182 (2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.

2013]WHICH INTERESTS SHOULD TORT PROTECT

3

sexual equality is the subject of public political morality,
insofar as it’s included in constitutional commitments and
human rights instruments, the fact that she cannot make a
claim grounded in that interest against her harasser in her
own name, as a matter of his obligations to her, as contained
in tort law, this inability seems all the more puzzling and
morally problematic.
The main argument for the political importance of the
interests tort protects rests on two central propositions,
which, so far, have not been well recognized. The first
proposition is that regardless of what theory or principle of
tort law we take to justify it—the standard ones are
economic accounts and some variant of corrective justice
theory—tort does, simply as a matter of fact, protect a
determinate set of interests. We can, in other words,
describe the interests protected by tort rights simply by
looking at existing tort doctrine. By implication, that set of
interests is selected and, thus, prioritized by the institution
of tort over other possible interests that could be protected
instead. The second proposition is that tort law has an
expressive function: it is the institution that determines
what our legal rights and obligations are to one another,
independent of voluntary agreements or assumed legal roles
and, as such, affects our expectations of ourselves and of
others.
These
two
facts
together—tort’s
inescapable
prioritization of a determinate set of interests, together with
its unavoidably expressive function—mean that tort law is
always expressing values; it is, in other words, integral to
the positive political morality of its society, whether we
want it to be or not, and regardless of whether we think it
can be narrowly understood to defray accident costs or used
as a means of implementing corrective justice. This
conclusion has normative implications for liberal political
society: since it is always expressing values, the values it
expresses ought to be justified against the background
political morality of our constitutive moral commitments.
The main argument of this Article, then, will be that the
array of interests tort law currently protects is unjustified,
and that it ought, presumptively, to protect the array of
interests to which we have committed as a matter of public
political morality.
The manner in which tort law has, for centuries,
selected which rights and obligations will obtain among the
individuals in society is that judges have decided, on a case-
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by-case basis, which interests warrant legal protection, and
to what degree. The decisions of earlier judges have largely
bound those of later ones, so that the interests, selected for
protection through tort rights and obligations, crystallized
quite early and came to be seen as characterizing or
constituting tort as a legal category. As a result, we have
inherited a system of tort law that has selected and
prioritized certain interests—namely, immunity from
physical harm and from some psychological harms, property
in a variety of forms, and some reputational interests—over
others, such as various forms of equality, interests in
expression, conscience, association, privacy, and a right to
low-cost rescue.4 Tort’s existing conceptualization of the
person, and the interests to be protected on his or her
behalf, is by and large a proprietary one.5 The second group
4. In the preface to his textbook TORTS, Richard Epstein asserts that “[a]t its
core,” tort protects individuals’ “right to use and dispose of their own labor and
the further right to exclude others from the use of their property[,]” and is
founded on the “bedrock proposition” that “each person owns his or her body and
has the exclusive right to use his or her talents as he or she sees fit.” He calls
this the “basic autonomy assumption” and argues that it grounds tort’s “primary
function[,]” namely “to protect innocent . . . individuals from external aggression
to their person and property.” RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS, at xxx (1999).
5. It is, of course, recognized that tort protects a variety of interests that are
neither strictly material nor strictly proprietary: the dignitary interests
protected by intentional torts, the interests in reputation protected by torts of
defamation and slander, and the privacy interests protected by torts of invasion
of privacy in the United States and by breach of confidence in the United
Kingdom are clear cases in which interests, besides real property and physical
integrity, are protected by tort. Nonetheless, my claim is that there is a
tendency within both main theories of tort, the loss based and the corrective
justice-based, to take property, and a proprietary conception of the person, as
part of the moral grounding of tort. It is this proprietary conceptual tendency,
which, it seems to me, buttresses the existing law’s emphasis on protecting
property and physical integrity over a broader range of nonmaterial interests
(such as constitutionally enumerated interests in religion, equality, association,
antidiscrimination) that I find problematic. Loss-based theories of tort are
generally concerned to explain rectification of material losses, and corrective
theories following Ernest J. Weinrib’s general moral formalism seem to me
embedded in the Kantian interpretation of the juridical rights as ‘external’ to
the person, and ‘belonging’ to him or her. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW 22-55 (1995). Lorraine E. Weinrib and Ernest J. Weinrib point to
the connection between reputation—a nonproprietary interest in the material
sense—and a proprietary conception of the juridical rights: “Kant seems to have
considered reputation as the same kind of right as bodily integrity. ‘[A] good
reputation is an innate external belonging . . . that clings to the subject as a
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of interests I just outlined—call these nonproprietary
personal interests—has become prominent through
processes of constitutionalization and the codification of
human rights that have taken place, in large measure, after
the judicial establishment of the ‘tort interests.’6 I will argue
that tort’s prioritization of the proprietary is not obviously
justified. The question I will then take up, therefore, is:
what ought to determine the selection of interests that will
be reflected in the rights and obligations of tort law?
This Article will proceed as follows. In Part I, I will lay
out several of the main candidate proposals that seek to
justify the set of interests tort currently protects. In Part II,
I will argue that tort’s inevitable selection and prioritization
of a determinate set of interests for protection, together
with its expressive function in political society, makes it
incumbent upon those who would defend the existing
institution of tort to justify the particular set of interests it
protects against the background of public political morality.
I will argue that tort ought, therefore, to be conceptualized
in a way that leaves it open to input about which interests it
ought to protect as rights. The core of my argument in this
Part will be that, if we take a society’s moral values to be
articulated in public law rights, the prioritization by tort
law of proprietary interests over the interests protected by
these public law rights is presumptively unjustified, and
that a balance ought to be struck between interests of these
different types, even within what has so far been considered
to be ‘purely private’ law. More specifically, the presumption
of justification, the burden of proof, should be shifted from
assuming the existing institution to be justified, to
requiring that it justify itself to, and against, the
background of the public moral commitments that have
been made by society. Tort could justify the interests it
currently protects only if it can meet this burden of
justification, remaining open to input from the public
political sphere about which interests it ought to protect. In
person.’” Lorraine E. Weinrib & Ernest J. Weinrib, Constitutional Values and
Private Law in Canada, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW 48 & n.18 (Daniel
Friedman et al. eds., 2001) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 111 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991)).
6. In the Anglo-American common law tradition, tort is part of the common
law, which is made by judges. Tort rights—and the delineation of the interests
they protect—have largely been established by judges on a case-by-case basis.
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Part III, I will argue that the existing justifications for the
set of interests tort protects are normatively insufficient to
fully justify the institution of tort against the background
requirements of public political morality in a nonideal
political society such as ours.
Having established the normative need for this
conceptual openness, I will, in Part IV, consider four
objections to conceiving tort in the way I suggest. The first
is the charge that if tort is conceived of as conceptually
open, with respect to the interests that it protects, it will
lose its distinctive apolitical form—its institutional
autonomy from other areas of law.7 The second objection is
that tort actions will become redundant once the rights and
obligations that tort establishes among individuals are
understood to protect the same panoply of interests that are
articulated in public law. These interests will be protected
elsewhere in the legal system. My response to this objection
is to emphasize my view that of tort’s normatively valuable
institutional distinctiveness that does not refer to the
interests it protects, nor sees tort as embodying a unique
form of justice, but focuses, rather, on tort’s expressive
function; its capacity to promote a culture of respect for
rights and, in particular, for the notion of rightssubjectivity. I thus argue that we do have reason to conceive
of and retain tort law as a distinct category of causes of
action. On my view, however, this category would not be
held together by the interests it protects, but by its
institutional
structure
of
direct
complaints
and
compensation among individuals. This structure, I will
suggest, holds a distinctive expressive and instrumental
value for political society. This Part will close with a brief
exploration of the possible constraints that might be
imposed on tort’s substance—on the interests it protects as
rights—by this interpretation of its institutional value. Part
V will conclude the argument.

7. For an example of the view of tort as apolitical and institutionally
autonomous see Amnon Reichman, Property Rights, Public Policy and the
Limits of the Legal Power to Discriminate, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW,
supra note 5, at 245, 247.
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I. WHICH INTERESTS SHOULD TORT PROTECT?
In an intuitive response to this question, one might
reasonably rely on a variety of factors: these could include
intuitions about our moral obligations to other individuals
(obligations, say, of noninterference, aid, and beneficence),
as well as ideas about how private legal obligations ought to
be subject to principles of justice, and if so, which ones. One
might think about how political society ought to be
structured so that there is some moral division of labor
between different types of legal rules; and one might think
about how private legal obligations could further some
social purposes. One might also consider how decisions
ought to be made about which moral obligations, which
interpretation of justice, which political ordering, and which
social goals one ought to take up in deciding which
obligations to impose on people, and to allow them to sue
one another to vindicate.
If, however, one looks to the body of theory that is
specifically about tort law for guidance in answering the
question—namely, tort theory—one finds that there is a
very short menu of possibilities on offer. Theories of tort law
generally divide into three broad types of answers to the
question, namely, welfare economics, corrective justice, and
those that view tort as an instrument for distributive justice
and equality.
A. Welfare Economics—Loss-Based Views
One branch of tort theory—the economic approach—was
initially developed by welfare economists,8 and has been
taken up by scholars in the field of legal scholarship known
as ‘law and economics.’9 The economic approach offers a

8. The theory that dominates the field today arguably began with Ronald
Coase’s article on social cost and Guido Calabresi’s first article on tort law.
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.,
Oct. 1960, at 1; see also Roscoe Pound, The Economic Interpretation and the Law
of Torts, 53 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1940) (defining the “economic interpretation” as a
theory of how the rise and fall of various economically powerful interests can
explain changes in tort law, while arguing that this analysis may in fact only
account for a small part of the changes within the law of torts).
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consequentialist answer to the question of which interests
tort protects.
There is naturally diversity of opinion within this type
of account, but I will group these types of views together
and refer to them henceforth as ‘loss-based’ theories of tort
since my interest in it is relatively simple.10 On this view,
tort is the institution through which society allocates the
losses incurred through accidents.11 The explanatory aspect
of the theory says that all the thousands of judicial
decisions that have developed and constituted the body of
tort law over the past eight centuries or so point to the
conclusion that the institution (if not judges themselves)
has been guided by a norm to maximize wealth by
minimizing the social costs associated with accidents.12
The loss-based theories take the tort of negligence to be
the institution’s paradigmatic rule and view the balancing
undertaken between fault and strict liability to be the law’s
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM M LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW (1987); STEPHEN J. SPURR, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF LAW
(2005); ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (Jenny Wahl
ed., 1998); Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 657
(1975); Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory
Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 417 (1984); Richard
A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 205 (1973).
10. This type of grouping is by now a quite conventional one. For a more
detailed overview of these categories of theories see John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 920-28 (2010)
(comparing loss-based theories of tort with wrong-based theories of tort); Scott
Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV. 67
(2010) (arguing for reform of both economic and corrective justice loss-based
theories of tort); Jules Coleman & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of Tort Law, THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/torttheories (last updated Aug. 26, 2010) (identifying losses as central to both
economic and corrective justice theories of tort).
11. Coleman & Mendlow, supra note 10, at § 2. These costs include both the
substantive costs borne by injured parties and transaction costs. See Hershovitz,
supra note 10, at 75-78.
12. Landes and Posner claim that the economic theory works with the
hypothesis that “the common law of torts is best explained as if the judges who
created the law through decisions operating as precedents in later cases were
trying to promote efficient resource allocation.” LANDES & POSNER, supra note 9,
at 1.
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way of shifting accident costs to the party who could have
avoided the loss most cheaply.13 Because of tort’s bilateral
structure of complaint and compensation, there are only two
possible parties on whom the law will impose the losses
associated with harms: either they will be allowed to “lie
where they fall,” in other words to be left for the injured
party to pay for, or it will be shifted to someone else, i.e., the
party who caused it.14
Although most decisions in the tort of negligence have,
over the decades, continued to use the more normative
language of reasonableness as a community standard of
care required in taking action, and that of reasonable
foreseeability of harm and of the class of victims of a given
action’s risks, economists have picked up on one judge’s
‘formula’ for the appropriate balancing of the value of action
with the cost of taking risks. The judge was Learned Hand,
and his formula is a simple way of getting at the basic norm
of negligence that economists adopt. The formula says that
a defendant has breached his duty of care if B < P x L,
where B is the burden of precautions (the cost that would
have been required to prevent the loss), P is the probability
of the loss occurring (the risk materializing into injury), and
L is the magnitude of the loss.15 So the defendant acted
wrongfully—breached his duty—if the amount it would
have cost to prevent the accident, and the loss, would have
been less than the amount of the loss that actually occurred,
multiplied by the probability of it occurring.
So suppose, for example, that in a fit of frustration at
my carpentry errors, I throw a hammer over my fence and
hit you on the head, causing an injury that we quantify as
costing you one day’s wages—$100. The probability of my
hitting someone walking past with my hammer was, say,
one in ten. The magnitude of the loss, $100, multiplied by
its probability, one in ten, is $10. So, I will be liable in
negligence if the burden of precaution for avoiding that loss
would have cost less than $10. If it would have cost more,
then I have done nothing wrong and the loss ought to lie
13. Coleman & Mendlow, supra note 10. Many have criticized economists’
emphasis on negligence as unwarranted by the doctrine. See, e.g., Goldberg &
Zipursky, supra note 10, at 955-57.
14. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10, at 923.
15. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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where it fell. Now, of course, to fully explain how these
quantities are calculated would require a great deal of
economics, but the basic idea will suffice to consider the
principle.
The basic assumption behind this approach is that,
before their interaction, parties have agreed on a principle
that would govern the allocation of any resulting losses. The
idea is that they would, if rational, have selected this rule,
whereby they would not spend more on precautions than
the cost of any resulting loss. Of course, ahead of time they
would not know which of them would be the injurer and
which the victim; the principle is one for reducing the costs
of accidents across many people, rather than for any given
injured person.16
Loss-based views explain what appears to be the central
function of tort law, namely, to compensate victims of injury
for the losses they suffer. The venerable jurist, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, in his seminal treatise, The Common Law,
claimed that tort law is directed against the doing of harm,
rather than against the violation of rights and duties—its
purpose was “to secure a man . . . against certain forms of
harm.”17 Even if one thinks—as some corrective justice
theorists do—that the quantification of losses is meant as a
remedial approximation to make people whole after wrongs
have been committed against them, rather than for losses
imposed, it is hard to escape the intuitive conclusion, based
on its structure, that at least part of what tort law ought to
do involves the compensation for losses and harms suffered.
The rhetoric, used widely in tort, of ‘making someone whole’
as the point of compensation clearly implies the existence of
a loss that took away from their wholeness in the first place.
From a normative standpoint, too, the role of loss and
harm in tort law is hard to discount. The only way to think
of loss, setback, or harm to interests as secondary to tort’s
purpose is to think of it as exclusively concerned with
remedying violations of primary rights. This would mean
that tort tells us, ahead of inflicting injuries, how we ought
to treat people, so that the right to compensation is

16. Coleman & Mendlow, supra note 10.
17. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 144 (Harvard Univ. Press
2009) (1881).
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understood as secondary.18 Even on that account, though,
the content of the primary rights can be understood as a set
of protected interests. If A violates some right of Bs without
causing a measurable, material loss—such as an
unconsented-to-touching that causes no injury or emotional
distress—that does not mean that there has been no setback
to B’s interests at all. B suffers a loss of a different kind: of
being intruded upon, invaded, intentionally, by another
person, and we can think of B as having experienced a harm
or loss to those interests.19
Loss-based theories fail to adequately explain certain
important features of tort. This failure forms the substance
of much complaint against loss-based theories by corrective
justice theorists, so I will merely summarize their
explanatory concerns here. Although clearly concerned with
loss, tort does take wrongfulness into consideration, in, for
example, the particular causes of action it has developed for
intentional torts, and its allowance—unlike much of
contract law—for punitive damages.20 Loss-based theories
also, importantly, fail to account for tort’s constitutive
structure of individual complaints and direct compensation.
Why, after all, if the minimization of accident costs were the
central point of tort law, would it not make more sense for
victims to be able to sue a party who could have prevented a
loss much more cheaply than the actual inflictor of injury
could?21 Why not allow some third party to sue least-cost
avoiders where victims cannot?

18. See Coleman & Mendlow, supra note 10 (comparing the first-order duties
not to injure with the second-order duties of repair).
19. It is in advertence to this type of setback that Weinrib’s relational view
seems highly compelling, since it can recognize the loss to freedom as a
normative loss, and thus a wrong, without requiring proof of material injury.
But it seems to me that our conception of rights as interests has, in general,
evolved to the point where we can acknowledge that an invasion of a nonmaterial interest is a setback to an interest, so that we do not need a purely
formalist theory to say that such an interaction is wrongful. See Weinrib &
Weinrib, supra note 5, at 43-72.
20. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10, at 967.
21. Coleman argues that this structure, in which “[t]ort suits bring victimplaintiffs together with injurer-defendants” is not explained by economic
analysis “at all.” Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J.
1233, 1241 (1988); see also Hershovitz, supra note 10, at 90 (“[O]ne of the most
curious facts about tort is that it allocates accident costs incident by incident
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The institutional connection between the victim and the
tortfeasor (tort- or wrong-doer) is as central to tort as the
institutional importance of the doctrine of privity is to
contract law. This idea seems too important to leave out.
Further, from an economic point of view, the important
costs are the ones that have not occurred yet, since they can
be avoided. Risk, rather than harm, ought to be the
institutional focus of this point of view; yet in tort—at least
in the case of negligence, which economists take to be
paradigmatic—harm in the form of damage or injury that
has in fact occurred must be proved, and proved to have
been caused by the tortfeasor, before a cause of action can
be established.
B. Corrective Justice
According to corrective justice theories, tort law is
concerned, at least to some degree, with enacting corrective
justice. The basic idea here is that wrongdoers have a duty
to compensate the parties injured by their wrongful conduct
for their wrongfully imposed losses. 22 I will henceforth be
using ‘corrective justice’ as a term of art that describes a
theory that unifies a family of tort theorists. Corrective
justice, here, in other words, does not simply mean
something like ‘justice, however imagined or construed, as
between one individual and another, or justice as just any
fair mechanism of rectifying wrongs.’
The most normative version of corrective justice theory,
it seems to me, is that of Ernest Weinrib,23 for whom it
combines the Aristotelian idea about the forms of justice 24
through private lawsuits, even though other mechanisms seem better suited to
minimize . . . the costs of avoiding accidents.”).
22. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS
RISKS AND WRONGS].

AND

WRONGS 325 (1992) [hereinafter COLEMAN,

23. See WEINRIB, supra note 5; see also JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF
PRINCIPLE (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN, THE
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE] (Jules Coleman’s influential conception of tort as
explained by corrective justice); COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 22;
Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV.
427 (1992) [hereinafter Coleman, The Mixed Conception]; Jules L. Coleman, Tort
Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349 (1992); Jules
Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (1982).
24. ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Robert C. Bartlett et al., trans.,
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press 2011).
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with the Kantian articulation of private rights, or ‘jural’
rights, as protecting equal freedom.25 In Weinrib’s view,
private law (including tort, contract, and property) is
characterized by a different form of justice from that of
public law’s distributive form. Distributive justice has a
geometric form, so that the normative question concerns the
criteria—merit, status, height, virtually anything selected
by the demos—according to which goods ought to be
distributed within a society. Distributive justice is
concerned with the question of proportionality rather than
quantity, and public law is a manifestation of this form of
justice. Corrective justice, by contrast, is arithmetic; it is not
concerned with the overall distribution of holdings, but with
quantities in individual interactions. Where a given
transaction is wrongful, any gain made by one party, at the
expense of the other, must be ‘corrected’ by having exactly
that quantity returned to its former owner. For Aristotle,
this form of justice holds against a normatively correct
background distribution, and thus the moral division of
labor between the two forms is justified. Weinrib’s
development of the idea of this form of justice imbues the
idea of the quantity that has been improperly transferred,
and must be corrected, with a normative rather than a
material content—namely, the Kantian idea of external
freedom. It is this freedom, in Weinrib’s view, that is
improperly transferred in wrongful interactions, so that the
material rectification we see in tort law’s compensation
system is merely a reflection of that improper usurpation of
one person’s external freedom by another.26 What is
corrected through material compensation, in this view, then,
is the wrong itself, rather than the loss occasioned by the
wrong.
The idea of ‘private’ rights, in this account, refers to
rights that can be justifiably enforced by judges because
their content is before, or external to, procedurally correct
democratic lawmaking.27 The argument that the coercive

25. See WEINRIB, supra note 5, at 84-113.
26. Id. at 122.
27. Kantian right supplies the content of corrective justice’s norms, in
Weinrib’s view. Kant’s view of legality, Weinrib says, is “an idea of reason [that]
provides the archetype for bringing the juridical organization of humanity ever
nearer its greatest possible perfection.” As such, he argues, it “obliges every
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enforcement of ‘external freedoms’ is justified assumes that
it is justified in the absence of any structure of public justice
or political morality,28 and anyone could, in principle,
enforce these kinds of rights coercively and be justified in
doing so.29 This is a very minimal idea about what kinds of
moral rights justify coercion, referring us, in our search for
the appropriate range of interests tort should protect, to the
content given by Kant to the rights of external freedom,
namely, the proprietary rights.30 The morality of tort law, on
this view, is ‘immanent’ in it—tort law does not do justice,
for Weinrib, it embodies justice.31
On this normative account, to the extent that tort law
embodies corrective justice, it is a good thing to have
around.32 This latter point is one on which less normatively
inclined corrective justice theorists part ways with Weinrib,
taking the position that corrective justice is the normative
basis of tort law, and explains tort, but leaving open the
question of whether corrective justice is itself a good thing.33
legislator.” Id. at 92. Weinrib views tort as itself justificatory, insofar as it
embodies an idea of reason that addresses both parties to a transaction.
28. Many corrective justice theorists recognize a narrow public role of tort
law, but still they take the proper role of tort to be to embody the normative
theory they set out, and thus to be restricted to the propriety array of interests.
See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92
VA. L. REV. 1391 (2006); see also Peter Benson, The Idea of Public Basis of
Justification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 273 (1995) (arguing that the
institution of contract must be justified according to a public basis of
justification).
29. Here I mean to emphasize Weinrib’s view of the “successive”
externalization of right, in which the role of the judge is the third normative
stage, the more fundamental normative principles of asserting one’s external
personality and protecting what each person owns as his are prior to
adjudication. See WEINRIB, supra note 5, at 101.
30. See id. at 128 (“right to one’s bodily integrity”); see also id. at 128-29
(referring to the right to the “external objects of the will” and requiring rights in
property).
31. See generally id. at 128-29 (Weinrib’s first major thesis, that of the formal
“immanent intelligibility,” with which corrective justice supplies tort law); see
also id. at 19.
32. In the introduction to the book, Weinrib argues that tort law’s
justification is noninstrumental, nonfunctional, but intrinsic, or ‘immanent’—he
analogizes it, on this front, to love. Id. at 5.
33. Coleman and Perry, for example, acknowledge that, as Perry puts it, “The
moral force of corrective justice is . . . partly, but not entirely, dependent on the
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The second important distinction within corrective
justice theory concerns the role of loss, and, thus, of human
well-being. For Weinrib, private law is an instantiation of
Kantian right.34 In his view, loss and gain are not properly
constitutive components of tort as dimensions of the good. 35
Jules Coleman, by contrast, calls his version of corrective
justice theory a ‘mixed’ one, precisely because he takes
losses to have an independent normative significance within
tort.36
Coleman objects to Weinrib’s so-called ‘relational’ view
that tort corrects the normative relation between the
parties to a wrongful interaction—returning that relation to
one of equal moral status—partly on explanatory grounds:
tort rules grant damages to injured parties in the quantity
of their loss, rather than according to an estimation of the
‘badness’ of the tortfeasor’s conduct.37 Also, so-called
‘completed’ harms, meaning harms that have resulted in
injury, are necessary before a legal tort claim can be made. 38
But, explanation aside, Weinrib and Coleman agree that
corrective justice creates agent-relative reasons for action,
reasons that give rise to duties of repair.39 Where a loss has
underlying theory of distributive justice.” Stephen Perry, The Mixed Conception
of Corrective Justice, 15 HARV. J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y, 917, 918 (1992); see also
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 22.
34. For an example see WEINRIB, supra note 5, at 19, where Weinrib lays out
his argument. “The idea of private law lies in the synthesis of . . . three theses.”
These are, first, tort law’s “immanent intelligibility,”—specifying Weinrib’s
formalist methodology; the second thesis claims that this immanent
intelligibility is provided by Aristotle’s conception of corrective justice; the third
thesis “concerns the normativeness of corrective justice.” The latter, he says, is a
“justificatory structure that pertains to the immediate interaction of one free
being with another. Its normative force derives from Kant’s concept of right as
the governing idea between free beings.” Id. (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., id. at 86. Kant’s view, says Weinrib, is not of law in terms of
protected interests, but as “a distinctive community of concepts within whose
regulatory structure every free will can protect whatever interests it has.”
Kantian right distinguishes the right, which involves freedom, from the good,
which concerns welfare, and makes the former primary over the latter. See id. at
130-33.
36. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 22, at 303-28.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 319-23.
39. See, e.g., id. at 311-13.
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been created through a wrongful interaction, though in the
absence of the loss’s independent normative significance, it
might give rise to agent-neutral reasons to repair it. In
order to explain why only the wrongdoer ought to have a
special reason to act to repair the loss, the loss must itself
be capable of generating a reason for action for that actor
(independent of being punished for the wrong), thus
allowing for corrective justice’s characteristic agentrelativity.
The disputes among corrective justice theorists are
complex, and for my purposes I only need to know what the
differing views have to say about which interests tort ought
to protect. In Weinrib’s view, ‘interests’ are the wrong way
to think about tort rights, because tort rights are grounded
only in right, rather than in well-being.40 Nonetheless, a
range of interests are, in fact, inevitably protected by tort
rights, no matter how one thinks those rights may be
theoretically justified, so the question cannot simply be
avoided by reference to ‘the right.’ In effect, then, Weinrib’s
view answers the interests question in terms of the content
of the external freedoms specified by Kant in his discussion
of private right.41
In Coleman’s view, though, because room is made for
the normative significance of loss, and of well-being more
generally, interests have an explicit role in corrective
justice.42 On his mixed conception of it, corrective justice
includes the principle of wrongfulness in the conduct of the
actor and that of the wrongful loss inflicted on the injured
party.43 Rights come into this picture to distinguish loss
from wrongful loss. Even when accompanied by loss, not all
conduct that is wrongful generates reasons for

40. For an illustration of this aspect of the view see Ernest J. Weinrib, Right
and Advantage in Private Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1283, 1308 (1989).
41. Id.
42. Stephen Perry also criticizes this aspect of Weinrib’s view in The Moral
Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 478-86 (1991) (criticizing
Weinrib’s view of interests’ role in corrective justice).
43. Benjamin Zipursky and John Goldberg also emphasize, in their wrongsoriented ‘civil recourse’ conception of tort, that wrongs are “injury inclusive,”
thus adverting to the normative role of loss. See Zipursky & Goldberg, supra
note 10, at 943.
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compensation or repair.44 However, wrongful loss can
sometimes generate a duty of repair (as in cases of
necessity), even in the absence of wrongful conduct, because
the injurer acted intentionally and violated another person’s
right. The violation is constituted, here, by a setback to a
‘legitimate interest’ in which one has a right.45
On Coleman’s account, rights seem to have a kind of
proprietary relation to interests, thus allowing for the idea
that infringing interests can be wrongful even when, as in
the case of necessity, there seems to be no element of moral
fault in the doer’s conduct.46 Wrongfulness can sometimes
occur, in these cases, where the agent has not done
anything culpable or blameworthy—this is because wrong is
associated with the infringement, or violation, of a right. 47
Coleman gives the example of Hal, a diabetic who, in need
of insulin, takes some (not all) of Carla’s supply without her
permission, so that he does not fall into a coma. Since
Coleman contends that Hal has done nothing wrong, but
nonetheless owes Carla compensation, the category of
‘wrongful loss’ is required, creating a connection between
Carla’s loss and Hal’s action—the connection is the violation
of Carla’s property right.48
That proprietary tendency, though, is really only an
implicit and conceptual matter and does not seem to reflect
44. See, e.g., COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 22, at 332 (discussing
the ways in which wrongful loss can come apart from wrongfulness, where an
interest is legitimate but in which there is no right).
45. Harm, for Coleman, occurs when a setback occurs to a legitimate interest.
A wrongful loss occurs when a harm results from a wrong or a wrongdoing; and
a wrong is a violation of a right. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note
22, at 346, 472. The important category being created here, normatively, is that
of wrongful loss. Coleman specifies, for example, that:
Some wrongs are infringements, that is, permissible or justifiable
invasions of rights. The losses that result from infringements are
wrongful in the sense required by corrective justice and are thus
compensable in justice, though the injurer acts in a permissible or
praiseworthy, not culpable, fashion. Losses therefore, can be wrongful
in the absence of culpable agency and agents who create such losses can
have a duty in corrective justice to repair them.
Id. at 334.
46. Id. at 335.
47. Id. at 331.
48. Id. at 292-96.

18

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

an assertion that only interests in property count as
‘legitimate’ for the purpose of the principle of corrective
justice. In this sense, then, Coleman’s theory simply does
not address the question of which interests tort ought to
protect, except insofar as he acknowledges its concern for
human well-being.49 To extrapolate from this aspect of his
view, we might say that the interests that ought to be
protected are those most closely connected to, or that best
promote, human well-being. For Coleman, I believe that a
fully welfarist specification of private rights would be an
unsatisfactory conclusion. This is because Coleman’s own
argument for the content, or substance, of rights (their
‘semantics,’ in his language), rather than their form or
‘syntax,’ involves reference to ‘community norms’ which
appear, for him, to be specified by the liability and property
rules which specify the very interests whose prioritization
through legal protection we are concerned with justifying.50
Moreover, although he confirms some relation between
legitimate interests and human well-being, the conceptual
tendency toward a proprietary view of rights—the idea that
rights are essentially something that prohibit intrusions—
suggest that Coleman’s conception of corrective justice
somehow combines a general moral concern for interests
with a prioritization of negative rights.51
There are, of course, other versions of the corrective
justice theory, ones that are less formalistic and less monist,
in that they accept tort might be doing other things besides
enacting or dispensing corrective justice.52 These theorists
dispute the correct version of the theory, but in the larger
49. Coleman, unlike Weinrib, assumes some version of an interest theory of
rights, on the basis of which rights protect particularly important legitimate
interests. Id. at 326.
50. See id. at 339.
51. One reason I say this is that the examples Coleman gives to delineate
rights involve property rights. Hal’s conduct, on his view, is not analyzed
according to a competing right, but in terms of its justification simply by
reference to the blanket principle of necessity. My more general point here is
that there is a proprietary inclination in corrective justice theory in general, and
that this seems to pervade even those theories that take rights to be interestbased.
52. See, e.g., John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of
Corrective Justice, 30 L. & PHIL. 1 (2011) (describing a less formalistic version of
the corrective justice theory, and a less monist account of tort law).
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domain of tort theory they agree that corrective justice is, to
some degree, the normative basis of tort, and that it consists
of rights and duties of reparation for the commission of
wrongs.53
Rights-based accounts of tort are more commonly
accepted in the United Kingdom and Commonwealth
jurisdictions; whereas, in the United States, and
increasingly elsewhere, the theory of what tort is, and of
what it ought to be, is by and large dominated by economic
accounts of law. The significance of corrective justice, within
the taxonomy of theories of tort, then, is to some extent that
it represents the main intellectual challenge to the
dominant welfare-economics or utilitarian theories, keeping
alive the idea that tort protects moral rights.54
C. Tort and Public Law Values: Distributive Justice and
Equality
There is a considerable wealth of scholarship arguing
that tort ought to pursue the social good where that good is
construed in terms of egalitarianism, distributive justice,
racial and gender equality, and so on. These theories are
best thought of in one of two ways: either they can be taken
as sophisticated consequentialist views, according to which
tort laws ought to be, or are, shaped to promote specific

53. See generally Perry, supra note 42 (discussing the differing views on the
corrective justice theory).
54. Civil recourse theory also preserves a view of tort that is
nonconsequentialist, but which emphasizes wrongs—and legal wrongs in
particular, rather than rights. See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note
10. I do not include a discussion of Civil Recourse here as one of the candidate
proposals for an array of interests that tort ought to protect, precisely because it
is a highly structural account of tort, emphasizing what I am calling the direct
complaint and compensation procedure. Goldberg and Zipursky, though, take
the view that reparation is not distinctively characteristic of tort, and also that
tort provides recourse for legal wrongs, rather than any particular interests or
rights. The content of the interests it protects, in this view, then, is almost
entirely open. John Gardner argues compellingly that, in fact, corrective justice
and civil recourse are entirely compatible, and also that civil recourse on its own
does not explain what distinguishes tort from other aspects of private law, and
from equitable remedies in particular. See generally Torts and Other Wrongs,
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 46/2011 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1904834.
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values (such as racial equality or income equalization),55 or
certain other social goals or goods;56 or they tend to be
theories that make interpretive arguments for the insertion
of such values within existing tort doctrines.57 The problem
55. For an example of the argument that egalitarianism generally should
play a role in negligence law see Tsachi Keren-Paz, Egalitarianism as
Justification: Why and How Should Egalitarian Considerations Reshape the
Standard of Care in Negligence Law?, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 275 (2003).
56. For examples see Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 433, 440 (2011) (“While the manifest function of tort law is
civil recourse or compensation, its latent function is vindicating public wrongs.”)
and the early and still controversial work of Leon Green, Leon Green, Tort Law:
Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1959).
57. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 575 (1993) (arguing for the inclusion of feminist ideals in the
tort law system as well as in the study of tort law); Leslie Bender, From Gender
Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in
Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1 (1990) (using the work of Carol Gilligan to show the need
for gender difference analysis in the law); Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on
Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988) (arguing for the inclusion
of feminist themes in the tort law system); Martha Chamallas, Unpacking
Emotional Distress: Sexual Exploitation, Reproductive Harm, and Fundamental
Rights, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1109 (2009) (advocating for sexual autonomy
and reproduction to receive heightened protection through a tort based duty of
care); Chamallas, supra note 1 (discussing the intersection of torts and civil
rights law); Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race,
Gender, and the Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435 (2005)
(discussing the use of race and gender-based tables which perpetuate
discrimination and lead to lower awards for women and minorities); Martha
Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 463 (1998); Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and
the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990) (arguing for a feminist
influence of tort law and emotional harm); Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden
Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263
(2004) (discussing the disparate impact that damage cap laws would have on
women and the elderly); Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of
Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L. Rev. 847 (1997) (describing the impact of
tort reform proposals on women’s health as well as on injuries that are specific
to women); Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues
in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989) (arguing for inclusion of
feminism in the study of tort law); Mary Kate Kearney, Breaking the Silence:
Tort Liability for Failing to Protect Children from Abuse, 42 BUFF. L. Rev. 405
(1994) (advocating for an affirmative duty to protect children from abuse and
using tort law to allow injured children to recover damages for their injuries);
Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial
Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 763 (1996) (addressing the issue of race as it
relates to the tort reform debate); Camille A. Nelson, Considering Tortious
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with the first type of view is that, as in the case of more
standard welfare economics, it fails to advert to protecting
individuals in particular cases from suffering a
disproportionate burden in aid of the social goal. The
problem with the second type of view is that it simply
accepts the categorization of tort interests according to the
status quo: tort rights are conceived of in proprietary terms
insofar as considerations of race and gender, for example,
are inserted at a secondary level of interpretation—the
question of measuring damages, or of shifting the standard
of care, or such interests are interpretively inserted into the
interest in freedom from emotional harm; on this latter view
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is, it
seems to me, being asked to bear a load it simply cannot
and need not support.
While I am obviously sympathetic to the reformist
impulses of some of this work, it seems to me that it is, on
one hand, too radical; claiming that tort ought, as part of its
purpose, aim at eliminating income inequality, for
example.58 The main problem with such views, in the
context of my present argument, is that they assert a valueladen purpose for tort, such as the pursuit of distributive
justice, without justifying the selection of the particular
interest that purpose represents in the light of the array of
Racism, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 905, 907 (2005) (focusing on how tort law
might address race disparities to achieve racial recompense); Margo Schlanger,
Injured Women before Common Law Courts, 1860–1930, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.
79, 105-06 (1998) (discussing socially constructed roles for men and women);
Jennifer B. Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on Race and
Remedies, 1865–2007, 27 Rev. LITIG. 37, 37-39 (2007) (discussing tort issues
affected by race); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury,
1900–1949, 49 HOW. L.J. 99, 100 (2005) (reviewing race in tort law); Jennifer B.
Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 129 (2001) (discussing
domestic violence in tort law); Jennifer Wriggins, Genetics, IQ, Determinism,
and Torts: The Example of Discovery in Lead Exposure Litigation, 77 B.U. L.
REV. 1025, 1028 (1997) (discussing the roles of gender and race in tort law).
58. See, e.g., Ken Cooper-Stephenson Corrective Justice, Substantive
Equality, and Tort Law and Economic Analysis, Substantive Equality, and Tort
Law, in TORT THEORY 48-68 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson, eds.,
1993). Cooper-Stephenson’s arguments that tort’s corrective structure operates
in, and ought to be developed to recognize, its ‘distributive context’ is an
example of this kind of view, which I take to beg precisely the question I am
interested in: Ought tort law take income equality or equality of holdings as an
interest it protects? And if such equality is not present, ought it pursue that
equality through individual litigation?
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public commitments. These views might be thought of as
not radical enough, on the other hand, insofar as they do not
require a reconsideration of the interests tort law protects
‘all the way down,’ as it were; so that, as I indicate in the
following section, tort would include proprietary interests
but only among others, where none of the interests were
given presumptive priority, but weighed in each case.
Again, in this context, the question is why the status quo is
itself justified.
II. REVERSING THE PRESUMPTION: UN-JUSTIFYING TORT’S
STATUS QUO
Having set out the main existing proposals for the
principles that ought to govern the selection of interests
protected by tort rights, I will now turn to the question of
whether the existing selection of interests protected by tort
law can be justified on any of the principles outlined above.
A. The Burden of Justification: Tort Law’s Protected
Interests and Its Expressive Function
Tort selects and protects a determinate set of interests,
even if we don’t think of it as doing so. Even if we take tort
to be protecting Kantian equal external freedom, or if we
take it to be allocating risk, it will, simply as a matter of
fact, protect some interests. Of course, the different
justifications for it will likely justify different sets of
interests. Regardless, my point is that no matter what we
take to be the justification for tort, we can identify a
particular set of interests it selects for protection as legal
rights.
By “interests” I mean to suggest one of two possible
ways of using the term, while setting aside a third use. The
use I want to set aside is the one that simply refers to
something like a stake or a benefit, viewed subjectively: so,
to say “I have an interest in the outcome of the vote” or “she
has an interest in making sure the party goes well” does not
yet imply that others have any reason to take the interest in
question to be normative. The first possible meaning of the
term “interests” I have in mind here can be taken to simply
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flesh out moral rights, to describe their content,59 or, second,
they can be taken to be independently important as aspects
of welfare.60 On either of these two latter meanings, the set
of interests protected by tort represents a selection and
prioritization of those interests over others—that is my first
claim.
Tort also has an expressive function within political
society. This is not a normative claim—I do not claim that
tort ought to have this function. Whether we want it to or
not, the set of interests that our political and legal
institutions protect, and hence the set of rights that those
institutions establish to constitute our direct legal relations
with one another, says something about the kind of society
we have, want, and are committed to. This set of rights and
obligations affects the expectations we have of ourselves
and one another, and expresses our view of what constitutes
due regard for persons in our society. So, my second claim is
that tort law is partly constitutive of political society, in the
sense that it expresses our sense of ourselves as persons
within society, and our sense of what we owe one another.
Taking these two features of tort law together—that it
inevitably selects a particular set of interests for protection,
and that this selection is politically significant in that it
expresses what we take our rights and obligations towards
each other to be—leads me to my first argument, namely
that it is incumbent upon those who design and defend the
institution of tort law to justify the particular set of
interests that it protects.
The next question, then, is: against what moral
background must this justification be given? Tort theorists
have for the most part addressed their justificatory projects
to the general moral concern with tort’s coercive function.61 I
59. It seems to me that Joseph Raz has this first function in mind when he
sets out the (now) famous definition that undergirds the modern interest theory
of rights. “X has a right,” Raz says, when some aspect of his well-being is of
sufficient moral importance to warrant the imposition of a duty on another.
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 166 (1986).
60. This latter function might be understood as an interpretation of Raz’s
definition; in this view, it is unclear how “rights” would not collapse into a
wholly consequentialist mode of reasoning about important interests. See id.
61. I say this because theorists of tort, as of many other areas of law, do not
put their justificatory arguments in terms more specific than that the law ought
to be explained and justified precisely because it is law. The assumption—a
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will argue that the justification for the interests tort selects
for protection, and hence for prioritization over others, must
be given against a background presumption of commitment
to public political morality enumerated in constitutive
documents.
The argument here will be, first, that given the public
and constitutive character of bills of rights (both in
constitutions and human rights instruments), the interests
enumerated in them ought to be taken to have a
presumptive standing in representing society’s moral
values; and that the prioritization by tort law of proprietary
interests over these values is, thus, presumptively
unjustified. Second, I will ask whether the first two
proposals for the range of interests tort ought to protect—
the economic and the corrective justice-based—can offer a
justification for the selection of interests, represented by
tort’s status quo, that overcomes that presumption. Upon
close investigation they are, I will argue, either silent on the
normative question, or they defend the status quo on
unjustified grounds. The third proposal is the only one that
seems normatively plausible as a justification for a range of
interests grounding tort rights, although in its detailed
instantiations I find it misguided, and prefer, as I will
argue, to adopt a focus on the interests tort ought to protect
as rights.
B. Shifting the Burden of Proof-the Presumption Against
the Status Quo
When it comes to normative projects of institutional
design, such as the one I am pursuing here, two types of
questions are always present. The first is a substantive
question: which interests ought tort rights protect? If we
have a persuasive answer to this question, then that might
seem to be the end of the story. But when deciding
questions about coercive legal institutions—such as tort
law—we encounter the problem of justification in the face of
disagreement. Now, disagreement takes a variety of forms;
even in purely moral theory one encounters a range of
plausible views. However, normative questions about the
design of coercive institutions make the fact of
perfectly valid one—is that justification is required because of law’s coercive
effect.
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disagreement particularly relevant and inescapable. If one
is to be subject to a coercive rule of the state, then one is
entitled, from a moral and a liberal point of view, to ask
that that rule be justified in a way that is acceptable on the
basis of one’s individual political morality, or on that of a
public political morality. But even in respect of public
political morality, there can be substantial and reasonable
disagreement about what the content of a rule ought to be.
So, justification raises the second question I referred to,
namely, the procedural one of who decides—or, more
precisely, who has the power of final decision on the
substantive question.
These two questions are related: if we have a decision
procedure to which we attach enough normative weight,
then we may think that a decision reached through that
procedure will be acceptable, regardless of its substantive
content. So, a justification to someone affected by a coercive
rule might be that the rule was crafted by a legislature, in
which that person has a properly elected representative.
Conversely, if we have a sufficiently justified view about
which interests tort law ought to protect, then, to focus on
the question at hand, if those interests are in fact the ones
selected for protection, it may not matter, or it may matter
much less, how the decision was reached.
The existing array of interests protected by tort law is, I
will argue, presumptively unjustified on both the procedural
and the substantive fronts. The argument is as follows. We
have two major sources from which to derive moral
plausibility and justification, for the design of rules in
generally liberal societies.62 The first is the set of moral
commitments that a given society has made in constituting
itself: constitutional commitments and participation in
human rights instruments and treaties are the best
examples of these public moral commitments. The second
source is a broadly theoretical one, namely, the most widely
accepted principles of liberal political theory. Both these
sources suggest that the range of interests delineated by
tort law’s status quo is presumptively unjustified. I want to
emphasize the qualifier here: the argument is that public
moral commitments and liberal theory suggest that there

62. I argue for this view of the “sources” of justification in Chapter 2 of
PUBLIC RIGHTS, PRIVATE RELATIONS (forthcoming 2013).
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ought to be a burden of justification on the existing set of
interests tort protects.
1. The Substantive Question—Which Interests?
a. The Force of Public Moral Commitments. Consider,
first, the substantive question from the standpoint of public
moral commitments. Tort law forms the background rules of
society.63 Along with contract and property rules, it
establishes the obligations and entitlements that constitute
the direct legal relationship between individuals.64
Therefore, it has a significant impact on a variety of social,
political, and cultural facets of a society. The interests it
protects as rights will, at a minimum, be likely to contribute
to the overall understanding people in a society have of
what their legal status and role within that society is. It will
inform people’s sense both of what is expected of them and
what they can expect of others. The interests that tort
protects, then, ought to reflect, at least presumptively, the
interests that a society has articulated as important, by
committing to uphold them as individual rights.65 The
63. The idea of private law as the ‘background rules’ of a society is a fairly
common one; default rules are sometimes discussed in this sense. Richard
Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88
MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989). Background rules are clearly rules in the background,
as it were, in common law jurisdictions in which legislative policies are pursued
not, by and large, by reforms to tort and contract law, but through statutory
interventions, which are imposed with existing common law rules regarding
property and contract in the background. This idea has become especially
common in the growing discourse on the need to ‘horizontalize’ constitutional
law. See, e.g., Oliver Gerstenberg, Private Law in a Poly Contextual World, 9
SOC. L. STUD. 419, 425; see also Mark Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare
Rights, and the Judicial Role: Some Comparative Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L.
435, 435 & n.1 (2002) (arguing that when plaintiffs assert constitutional claims
against the state they are “act[ing] in a manner authorized by background rules
of property and contract,” but noting that sometimes the “background rules of
tort law” are invoked, which is analytically the same problem).
64. For example, in contrast to tax law, which of course has effects on and
among individuals, but does not set out to say how each of us ought to behave in
our interactions with those we come into contact with or whom our actions
affect.
65. Michael Rustad points out the way in which sociologists of law, in
particular Weber and Durkheim, engaged with the relationship between
entrenched legal forms and dynamic social structures. In particular, as Rustad
points out, Weber showed how “the ‘professional ideology’ of legalism . . .
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enumeration of interests in bills of rights and other human
rights instruments and treaties to which a society has
agreed, therefore, would appear to have a presumptive
status in constituting the content of tort rights.66 Deviations
from that set of interests might turn out to be justified, but
would have to be justified explicitly against that
presumption.
To see why this public moral commitment creates a
justificatory presumption in favor of those interests
specified in constitutive public moral commitments,
consider an interest enumerated in public law, but not
protected by tort—the interest in freedom of association.
Free association is expressed as a constitutional right in
virtually all liberal societies, as well as a core ‘firstgeneration’ human right. It is understood as a negative
right, and is, thus, much less controversial than a right to
welfare, housing, or education. In that sense, then, the
interest in free association, as articulated in constitutions,
is one of the facets of human life in a given society that most
societies have expressed a legal and moral commitment to
respecting, at least through their legal institutions.
Therefore, it is a moral problem, at least prima facie, that
an institution as core to the network of legal obligations as
tort would protect property and physical interests but not
an interest in free association. That prioritization means
that the institution of tort embodies a failure of society to

conflicted with democracy.” Rustad, supra note 56, at 442; see also JUDITH N.
SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORAL, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 60 (1986) (describing law
as “the official, politically sanctioned norms of matured legal systems”).
66. This is a different claim than the one made by constitutional scholars
that human or constitutional rights or principles ought to apply, legally, to
private law. See generally Oliver Gerstenberg, What Constitutions Can Do (But
Courts Sometimes Don’t): Property, Speech, and the Influence of Constitutional
Norms on Private Law, 17 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 61, 62 (2004) (noting the influence
of higher law on private law norms); Frank I. Michelman, The Bill of Rights, the
Common Law, and the Freedom-Friendly State, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 401, 412
(2003) (arguing that the common law should be “la[id] wide open to Bill of
Rights” scrutiny); Frank I. Michelman, W(h)ither the Constitution?, 21 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1063, 1081 (2000) (warning that continuing to confine application of the
Bill of Rights to government actors risks it becoming marginalized). Of course,
many scholars also claim—and this seems to be the prevailing legal position in
North America, that there is no such legal application of constitutional rights to
private actors.
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live up to at least one of the public moral commitments it
has made.
One might reply, though, that the interest in free
association is one that has special relevance to the public
sphere, because it is through association that political
societies form, grow, and thrive. Free association also has
special relevance to religious and other minority groups,
protecting them from the power of the overarching, coercive
institution that is the state itself—such specialness might
seem to be captured by the fact that free association is a
constitutional right, and thus a legal obligation not
applicable to private interactions. But there is a problem
with that line of argument. First, I am not claiming that the
right to freedom of association, as a legal/moral hybrid set
out in the constitution, ought to be protected by tort law. I
am asserting only that a commitment to respecting the
interest in free association is one of the central public moral
commitments of any constitutional society that enumerates
it as a right, precisely because making it a constitutional
right expresses a moral commitment that is partly
constitutive of the society. If that interest in free association
is not taken up in, or reflected by, the content of the rights
and obligations tort establishes, then tort has, as a legal
institution, failed to make good on that commitment.
Second, even if we think that one has to understand the
commitment to an interest expressed through its
enumeration within a bill of rights—in the context of the
public nature of the right that protects it—that does not yet
establish that the moral relevance of that context could not
be reproduced in the ‘private’ sphere regulated by tort. In
the case of free association, there is a moral parallel
between political and minority normative associations, such
as religions and their need for protection against the state,
and certain associations that form in the private sphere
whose purpose is to build up a vocal resistance to, and
practical force against, certain dominant actors. Unions and
other labor organizations, for example, operate to mitigate
the power disparity between individual workers and
employers—particularly
large
employers.
Labor
associations allow workers both to express their wishes and
voices in the context of their employment and to have their
interests protected. Their size and ability to acquire
resources from union dues, for example, allow them to gain
access to information unavailable to individuals, to coordinate and share that information, and to access legal
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advice and representation that would, similarly, be out of
reach of individual workers. Therefore, in moral terms, they
operate analogously to political associations, which give
individual citizens a voice in the political arena and some
measure of political power against the state.
If one is tempted to object, at this point, that employers
are neither coercive, nor entirely constituted by law, in the
way that the state is, and that employers are socially useful
in a particular way that we ought to respect; then one is, I
want to suggest, implicitly misled by the existing
institutional status quo, which treats the property and
contract rules that constitute corporate actors as ‘natural,’
and in some sense preinstitutional. States, like employers,
often pursue extremely worthy social goals. States can, for
example, pass laws aimed at preventing vicious hate speech,
and the bullying and harassment of minority groups, but
those worthy efforts have to be justified against the societal
moral commitment to an individual’s interest in free
association. Similarly, employers serve a useful social
function, creating jobs, wealth, products, investment, etc.
But employers are constituted by the proprietary and
contractual interests that tort protects, and there is, thus,
no reason why the protection of those proprietary interests
ought not to be required to be justified against respect for
the individual interest in association that would protect
labor unions in the public sphere. To protect the proprietary
interest in the employment context, and not the
associational interest, is simply to prioritize one set of
interests over the other, without any justification for doing
so, thus contravening a society’s moral commitment to the
latter interest, particularly on behalf of weak or minority
groups (such as employees within a large, multinational
corporation) within the institution in question.
Is the premise of the justificatory weight of public moral
commitments really a substantive basis on which to
determine the interests tort ought to protect? Perhaps it is,
rather, a procedural answer to the question, assuming that
the inclusion of some interest in a bill of rights reflects its
having been established as important by a decision
procedure—like a super-majoritarian one that created a
constitution—to which we attach significant normative
weight. I will come back to this point below. But whether or
not we take the constitutionality of certain interests to give
them a presumptive normative status for all legal
institutions (on the basis of the substantive moral pedigree
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of public moral commitments, or on the basis of their
normatively justified procedural pedigree) as a matter of
substantive moral principle, I will argue that political
philosophy does not have a definitive position that would
justify the existing set of tort rules in a nonideal context.67
In fact, as I will explain in the following section, the
opposite seems true: the major liberal philosophical
positions would, it seems to me, also likely require that
there be some presumption in favor of allowing the interests
protected as basic liberties to inform the interests protected
by tort law.
b. Tort law and Liberal Justice. A full argument for the
substantive content of tort on the basis of any particular
liberal theory of justice would require much more argument
than I can make here, but I will sketch the outline of one
such possible argument, simply to show that the
presumption in favor of the proprietary interests is
plausibly unjustified on the basis of liberal political theory.
We might be monists about the principles of justice,
whatever exactly we take them to be (I will gesture at the
application of the Rawlsian principles in this section only by
way of suggestion). Thus assuming that they apply directly
to individuals, tort would clearly have to justify itself
against the background principles, of which the protection
of the interests that comprise the basic liberties, at least,
would have to be presumptively prioritized. 68
But to make the case more difficult, assume we take the
principles of justice to apply only to the basic structure of
67. There is considerable scholarship on the subject of how tort ought to be
designed in ideal theory, as part of Rawlsian justice. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry,
On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Justice, in OXFORD
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 237 (Jeremy Horder ed., 4th Series, 2000); Peter
Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice,
77 IOWA L. REV. 515 (1991); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, On
Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort as Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1279 (2006);
Stephen Perry, Ripstein, Rawls, and Responsibility, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1845
(2004); Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92
VA. L. REV. 1391 (2006); Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the
Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2004) [hereinafter Ripstein, Division of
Responsibility]; Benjamin Zipursky, Rawls In Tort Theory: Themes and CounterThemes, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1923 (2004).
68. See Liam B. Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice, 27 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 251, 283 (1998).
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society. In that case, the question would be whether tort is
part of the basic structure of society. For that to be the case,
the institution of tort would have to, first, “distribute
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of
It
seems
advantages
from
social
cooperation.”69
straightforward to infer that tort law distributes
fundamental rights and duties, since it establishes the very
entitlements and obligations that we have, simply as
individuals within a society, outside of contract or of specific
legislative regulation. The claim that tort does, or should,
divide the benefits and burdens of social cooperation is more
problematic. On one hand, distributing wealth in the
context of individual transactions seems inefficient and
largely unjustified, since tort law proceeds on a case by case
basis, driven by litigation in response to some loss or
setback to an interest caused by someone else. Distributing
wealth on this basis seems ad hoc, and, thus, unfair because
it would be essentially arbitrary: those whose wealth would
become subject to redistribution for general allocative social
purposes, rather than directly for compensatory ones, would
be selected on grounds that have nothing in particular to do
with their wealth. On the other hand, though, tort is
already concerned with determining the division of
advantages and disadvantages arising from social
cooperation. Tort law regulates the burdens that arise in
the effects of—at least in the case of negligence law—
socially productive activities.70 A factory, whose effluent
harms people downstream, is an employer, a manufacturer,
and a contributor to social wealth and well-being. It is thus
presumptively socially productive and a manifestation of
social cooperation. Another manifestation of this
cooperation, though, is that there are people living around
the factory somewhere who might be harmed by its
pollution. They may work in the factory, they may be its
managers, its cleaning staff, or they may produce or repair
its machinery; they may simply be its neighbors. In any
event, when they are harmed, that harm is a burden arising
from social cooperation. Now, some benefits of that
cooperation have already been assigned—employees,
shareholders, consumers, for example, have all, presumably,
69. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7 (1971).
70. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10, at 923 (discussing the allocative
function of tort).
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benefited from the factory’s activities—but the burdens
associated with it fall on the particular people living
downstream. Tort law’s mandate is to decide whether that
allocation of burden is fair, and whether it should instead
fall on the factory itself. In at least that limited sense then,
tort is certainly concerned with the distribution of burden
and benefit associated with social cooperation.
I want to point out the above, but also note that this
line of argument makes a problematic assumption that is
also widespread among theorists of tort, who claim to argue
for its justification along Rawlsian lines: it takes for granted
that tort’s purpose and function is defined by its status quo.
That is, it assumes that tort’s purpose is to protect personal
freedom and security, as defined by the protection of the very
interests tort already happens to protect, according to some
principle.71 The interpretation I suggested above, following
this assumption and implying that tort forms part of the
basic structure of society, presumed that tort’s status quo is
constitutive and definitive of it. If we conceptualize it more
broadly, as an institution that establishes the individual
interpersonal rights and obligations within society, then its
potential role as part of the basic structure becomes even
more clear, because it will protect and promote certain
values over others, and contribute to people’s expectations
of themselves and of others within political society.

71. This is the case wherever theorists arguing for some kind of division of
responsibility between the public and private spheres, such as those who argue
for a distinctive role for corrective justice that is distinct from distributive
justice (this is true of Weinrib, Coleman, and Gardner, for example). It is
especially true in the case of those who make an argument that Rawls’ theories
are compatible with a system of private law—something like the one we have.
See, e.g., Peter Benson, Equality of Opportunity and Private Law, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 5, at 201; JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS:
A RESTATEMENT 138-62 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS]; Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls,
92 VA. L. REV. 1391 (2006); Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and
the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2004). The assumption in those cases
is fleshed out by the argument that in a state of nature one would find a right to
property whose proper instantiation requires there to be some public or publiclike adjudicator. The key point there is that the property rights (meaning
property in the Lockean sense referring to personal security as well as personal
property) are the ones associated with private law, and private law is
understood to have the purpose of protecting those rights.
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But assume we accept some principle of moral division
of labor, as Rawls does,72 and as do some theorists of the
relation between public and private law.73 In that case, some
interactions and transactions would be considered subject
only to the ‘private’ or ‘individual’ moral principles whose
purpose is to ensure fairness within individual transactions,
rather than being aimed at preserving background justice.
This conception would arguably generate something like a
Nozickean view of “free and fair transactions” that are
normatively justified,74 and are especially so if the other
institutions of political society redistribute wealth so that
holdings reflect some background pattern of equality. But it
seems to me that it is a mistake to understand tort as
constitutively distinct from political institutions in this way,
for the following reasons.
Consider this argument as it pertains to contract law.
One way of regulating the content of contracts is for
legislatures to pass statues setting out a minimum wage, for
example. But whether wage agreements, or the minimum
wage itself, is fair, will depend on background
circumstances—on, as Rawls says, “the nature of the labor
market: excess market power must be prevented and fair
bargaining power should obtain between employers and
employees.”75 And Rawls himself is clear that:
72. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 268-69 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
73. Most theorists of tort who incline toward corrective justice as its
normative foundation seem also inclined to view it as distinct from the basic
structure. See, e.g., ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 910 (1999) (noting that if “what Rawls calls ‘the basic structure’ of society is just .
. . once the [basic terms of interaction] are set, people are free to pursue their
own advantage as they see fit”). For political theorists not already convinced of
the justifiability of corrective justice, it can seem more puzzling. See, e.g.,
Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387, 389-93 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (questioning
“the justice of the relationship between tort liability and what individuals
deserve”).
74. Nozick describes a system in which, as long as the fairness of each
individual transaction is preserved, this will be sufficient to produce and sustain
fairness, thus obviating the need for the distribution of resources by the state.
See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 6 (1974) (“[W]hat persons may
and may not do to one another limits what they may do through the apparatus
of a state.”).
75. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 72, at 267.
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There are no feasible and practical rules that are sensible to
impose on individuals, which can prevent the erosion of
background justice. This is because the rules governing
agreements and individual transactions cannot be too complex, or
require too much information to be correctly applied; nor should
they enjoin individuals to engage in bargaining with many widely
scattered third parties, since this would impose excessive
76
transaction costs.

It would, therefore, seem that the appropriate way for
contract rules to properly conform to the basic structure is
to allow other institutions to make adjustments necessary
to create fair conditions for free contracting.
The mistaken view on this matter, it seems to me, is
that the corrective principle neatly maps onto—is, in other
words, coextensive with—the principle regulating individual
transactions, and that a principle of justice, such as justice
as fairness, similarly maps onto the affairs of the state, such
as taxation and other forms of distribution. But this is to
make two false assumptions.
First, it is to assume that ‘fairness’ in each individual
interaction or transaction, considered on its own—even in
the presence of an otherwise just basic structure—would
necessarily or even justifiably have a content entirely
independent of the principles of respect for individual rights
and basic liberties set out in constitutional moral
commitments, and in the moral principles of respect for free
and equal personhood.77
Consider, for a general illustration of the way public
moral commitments might be required to inform even
individual transactions, contract doctrine78: the basic
principle of contract is freedom and enforceability of
76. Id.
77. It is clear that against a background of unjust initial distribution, there is
a sense in which even fully ‘free’ transactions cannot be considered fair. But that
is not my point here.
78. Rawls himself, in Ripstein’s interpretation, viewed contract doctrine in
particular as being outside the basic structure, though others argue that
contract is within it, or, at least, that private law as a whole does not fall outside
the basic structure on that basis. See Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 67, at
1291-93; Ripstein, Division of Responsibility, supra note 67, at 1813. Because
my method here is different from Rawls and his contemporary interpreters on
this matter, pitched as it is at the nonideal, I can remain agnostic on the
question.
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contracts freely arrived at. Most of contract doctrine
involves cases in which there is some question about
whether the contract was fairly arrived at, or whether,
considered independently of its procedural formation, the
substance of the contract is one the law will enforce. It
seems plausible that the basic principles of contractual
freedom and contractual formation—requiring clear terms,
informed agreement from both sides, fair consideration, etc.
—could be subject to the moral principles, which, on the
overall division of labor, are aimed only at regulating
individual interactions rather than at preserving
background justice.
Some principles of contract, though, such as that of
unconscionability, can require that the law find some
contracts to be unenforceable because of their substance.79
Contracts for slavery are extreme examples of this kind.
Similarly, contractual doctrine allows that contracts be
invalidated on the grounds of public policy. But in
interpreting doctrines such as unconscionability and
“contrary to public policy,” courts must turn to fuzzy
normative concepts such as the reasonable person and the
prevalent morality of a community.80 But why would the
moral principles that regulate society as a whole, to which
that society has expressly committed itself, requiring
respect for political and social equality, for example, not
play at least a background or presumptively justificatory
role in determining the content of particular legal standards
of fairness throughout the system? Even, in other words,

79. For an example from the United States see U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2001)
(“Unconscionable Contract or Clause”).
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (C.A.D.C.
1965) (remanding the case after finding that a court could refuse to enforce a
contract it found to be unconscionable at the time it was made).
80. For an analysis in which the wrongfulness associated with
unconscionability is associated with community standards of morality see
Norberg v. Wynrib [1992] 2 S.C.R. 224 (Can.) (LaForest, J., plurality).
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with respect to what, exactly, constitutes a free and fair
transaction at the individual level.
Second, the categorical assumption—that tort and
contract law, for example, are subject to a discrete principle
that regulates individual transactions rather than
background justice—is unpersuasive. Part of the problem
here, it seems to me, is that Rawls uses the example of fair
property transactions as against a background of
redistributive fairness to illustrate the idea of the moral
division of labor. This misleadingly suggests that property
transactions cannot in themselves be problematic for the
background structure, and that direct regulation of those
“individual transactions” is not necessary to maintain and
promote background justice.81 That they can have such
problematic effects cumulatively seems clear enough, and
Rawls acknowledges the point, in respect of the property
rules pertaining to inheritance.82 If we are to preserve
background justice over generations,83 some limitations
might justifiably be placed on the property rules that allow
for the transfer of assets from one generation to the next.84
Presumably, racially restrictive bequests would fall into the
same category but would have pernicious effects, even one
at a time rather than by cumulating over time.
Even if we accept the division of labor between moral
principles, the protection of the basic liberties, or the fair
value of the political liberties, for example, could still
require individual transactions to be regulated on their own
terms. Leaving inheritance aside, racially restrictive
covenants are examples of property rules that create
obvious problems for a society committed to the respect for
equal rights, including the right to racial equality. Racially
restrictive covenants are cases in which a given piece of
property is set out for a particular use or set of uses—a
housing development, for example, or a campground—by its
81. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 72, at 52-54.
82. Id. at 51-53.
83. Because, as he says, even fair transactions—viewed on their own terms—
will likely lead to the accumulation of wealth in the hands of few, creating
problems for the fair value of the political liberties. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS, supra note 71, at 138-62.
84. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 72 at 263-64.
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private owner, on terms that are racially exclusive. Now, if
the property is sufficiently “private”—for the use of only a
particular exclusively privately owned neighborhood, for
example—then the restriction might not fall under the civil
rights legislation that is designed to protect the public as
such.
The categorical assumption further presumes that, as
‘private law,’ contract and tort are, ipso facto, morally
separable from the regulation of the basic structure, for the
purpose of the division of moral labor because they fall
under the category of regulating private, individual
transactions. But contract law and tort law are very
different in this respect: contract allows for, and enables,
social cooperation by allowing people to commit to
enforceable agreements that they are themselves the
authors of; tort, by contrast, establishes background,
involuntary rights and obligations. It is thus an institution
whose contents are not largely determined by those to whom
it will apply. It is in this respect that tort performs the
function that makes its inclusion in the basic structure
important:
[E]veryone recognizes that the institutional form of society affects
its members and determines in large part the kind of persons they
want to be as well as the kind of persons they are. The social
structure also limits people’s ambitions and hopes in different
ways. . . . So an economic regime, say, is not only an institutional
scheme for satisfying existing desires and aspirations but a way of
fashioning desires and aspirations in the future. More generally,
the basic structure shapes the way the social system produces and
reproduces over time a certain form of culture shared by persons
85
with certain conceptions of their good.

We have, so far, been considering tort law in this section
as though the interests it currently protects are the ones
that constitute it by definition. But it is largely the
institution that determines the limits of individual freedom
and property rights in respect of other important interests.
Given tort’s institutional role in fashioning social
assumptions about which interests are to be prioritized,
which interests are essentially constitutive of the person
such that they justify the restriction of basic freedom and
property rights within individual interactions, tort’s
85. Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
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inclusion of proprietary interests and exclusion of
nonmaterial personal interests, such as those manifested in
the basic liberties, seems problematic. It sends a message to
individuals about what kinds of interests constitute the
private person that warrants respect from other private
persons, and those interests are limited to the proprietary.
This is an institutional message that perpetuates an older
political culture, one in which property-holding and political
suffrage were conceptually linked, and thus undermines the
political conception of the person and of liberal political
culture.
A final point, here, that suggests a lack of justification
within liberal theory for tort’s privileging of the physical
and proprietary interests, and the proprietary conception of
liberty as an individual right to be limited only by the
security of others. In connection with his discussion of the
basic liberties and their priority within his theory of justice
as fairness, Rawls includes “the liberty and integrity of the
person” subsequent to the freedoms of thought and
conscience, and association and the political liberties that I
have described here as personal, nonmaterial interests, but
before the liberties associated with the rule of law.86 Now, it
might seem that the listing of individual liberty and
security together in the enumeration of the basic liberties
suggests precisely the kind of parallelism between the two
ideas that Weinrib,87 for example, argues that tort law
embodies. It would certainly suggest that, insofar as tort
limits each of liberty and security against the demands of
the other, it is justified in doing so on the basis of these both
being among the Rawlsian basic liberties.88 But these are
only two among several interests listed as basic, to be
pursued as the first aim of justice. What would justify
having an institution that protected the interests in
personal liberty and security, but not the other interests
that are similarly basic? Perhaps if those interests were
sufficiently protected by other areas of society, so that any
86. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 71, at 44.
87. This is the significance of what Weinrib discusses at length as formal
correlativity. See WEINRIB, supra note 5, at 114-44.
88. In JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, Rawls is explicit that the basic liberties do not
prioritize liberty in general, but are given by a list, in which he includes “the
rights and liberties specified by the liberty and integrity (physical and
psychological) of the person.” RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 71, at 44.
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infringement of association, say, by the operation of tort
rules against trespass, or inducing breach of contract, would
be corrected by the inclusion of free association in civil
rights legislation. But, as is evidenced by the case of free
association itself in the context of workers’ rights to form
unions, the interests enumerated as basic liberties are not
universally protected by legislation. Civil liberty statutes
are not themselves understood to protect prepolitical rights,
but rights that are necessary to protect given certain
patterns of historic injustice, such as slavery and racial
discrimination. Though some interests that are protected as
basic rights, such as free thought and free association, are
not clearly prepolitical (whatever we think the content of
those rights is, a matter I will return to later), nor are they
obviously corrective for historical injustice. But tort
establishes a set of basic rights applicable to all individuals
in all positions—rather than, as in the case of civil rights
legislation, only within certain social contexts and positions
such as employment—and thus have a special force in
playing the formative role Rawls describes with respect to
the institutions of the basic structure,89 fashioning the sense
citizens have of what their status as persons requires of
them and of others. There is at least a plausible inference to
be drawn about the kind of individualism, the kind of
personal action and freedom, which society most values,
from the rights and duties it establishes as basic at the
interpersonal level. What does it say about our political
social culture that I am personally accountable to you if I
walk onto your property, but not if I discriminate against
you or fail to save you from certain death, although doing so
would cost me nothing? My point here is that the institution
that establishes our basic rights and duties to one another
cannot prioritize certain interests over others without that
prioritization having a political significance and social
effect, and thus requiring explicit justification. We must,
therefore, shift the burden of justification from those who
would change the status quo onto those who would defend
it.
If we take tort rules, rather than individual actions, to
be appropriately subject to justice, then whatever the

89. See id. at 34-35 (discussing the role that the basic structure of society
plays in forming its citizens’ expectations).
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principles of justice one thinks apply to the basic structure90
—be they Rawlsian principles of justice as fairness or a
more general principle of deliberative democracy and
constitutional legitimacy—would also have to approve of the
composition of the tort rules in order to find that tort was
justified. A full instantiation of a Rawlsian or otherwise
liberal argument for the justice-based requirements of tort
law is outside the scope of this article. But remember that I
am not arguing that the interests specified in public law
must be included in tort, in order for the latter to be
justified. Rather, I am arguing only for a reversal of the
presumption, or burden of proof, that currently allows the
range of interests protected by tort to go unscrutinized
against the interests that constitute society’s most basic
moral commitments, and, in liberal terms, that form the
content of the most basic rights and liberties. Property
rights and other rights that constitute employers, for
example, are represented in a liberal view by economic
rights and freedoms. For an institution to prioritize those
interests, over the ones that ground the basic political rights
and liberties, is unjustified on its face. My claim here is only
that there is currently a presumption, in tort theory
especially, in favor of the status quo, so that an interest in
free association, for example, would have to be justified to
the status quo of tort, in order to be put on par, by private
law, with the proprietary interests already protected, and
given our constitutive moral commitment to interests, such
as association, that burden of proof is unjustified and ought
to be reversed. If tort is going to refuse to protect interests
publically enumerated as constitutively important, then the
burden of that prioritization of the proprietary ought to fall
on those who advocate for the status quo rather than
against it.
This is especially true given that the question of how to
interpret, justify, and, thereby, design the institution of tort
takes on a different cast from the standpoint of ideal theory
than from that of the nonideal theory. The Aristotelian
justification of the division of labor between the forms of
justice holds up only if both forms are enacted, promoted,
and respected at the same time, as they can be assured to
be in ideal theory. Similarly, one might think that it is the
job of the public sphere—the taxation system, and the
90. See Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 67, at 1290-92.
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criminal, regulatory, constitutional and quasi-constitutional
branches of law—to ensure that the basic rights and
liberties, and the constitutional essentials, are established
and upheld; and that, if the public sphere is doing its job in
maintaining those rights and liberties and in maintaining
appropriate equality, then the tort system, like that of
contract and property, can operate freely on a basis of
individual exchanges viewed entirely independently of the
social conditions that create the need for legal protections
for racial and religious minorities and women. Even if one
could understand private law as institutionally separable in
ideal theory, however, as matters currently stand in most
‘liberal’ societies, this background redistribution of holdings
does not take place, the value of equality is not adequately
respected, and there is thus no justification for holding tort
to be immune from playing its part in protecting the basic
liberties, at least up to the point where, at some mythical
future time, a background of equality exists such that all
individual transactions can be normatively independent and
governed by their own proprietary norms. And thus my
question is not about how tort law ought to be designed
against a background of ideal theory fully realized in society.
It is about how tort law ought to be designed so as to be
most justifiable to the members of the real society in which
we live. And in our actual society, our moral commitment to
the interests represented in bills of rights generate
presumptive requirements on all the institutions of society
to do what they can to realize the conditions of respect for
these interests.
2. The Procedural Question—Who Decides? There are
several possible views about who ought to decide on the
substantive question of which interests tort ought to
protect. One possibility is that the range of interests ought
to be determined by philosophers, or by legislators and
policymakers appropriately guided by philosophy. If my
argument above is sound, though, there is a presumption
against the status quo with respect to which interests tort
protects, and a requirement that that selection of interests
be justified. One way of justifying it would, arguably, be the
decision procedure by which it arose. My argument here is
therefore a narrow one, rebutting that possible justification
for the selection of interests currently protected by tort,
namely, that the existing range of interests is justified on
the basis of their pedigree.
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In the common law context in which tort law operates,
the ‘rules’ that constrain judicial lawmaking were made by
other judges. The interests that are deemed important
enough to justify restricting individual freedom and the
social benefits associated with productive action are, in the
tort context, products of the judicial imagination and the
moral convictions of judges. Holmes and others celebrated
this feature of the common law and emphasized its role in
the development of tort.91 But as Thomas Grey argues in
Accidental Torts,92 the development of tort into the form in
which we now find it was a contingent matter of judicial
decision:
To make every harm to an individual’s interests a wrong “would
interfere with other equally important enjoyments on the part of
his neighbors”’ Hence the law privileged certain acts against
liability even though the actor foresaw “that harm to another will
follow from them.” Holmes’ point in using this terminology was to
emphasize that the rights and duties established in tort decisions
were not premises taken from pre-existing law, but conclusions
shaped by the judges’ traditional common law power to strike the
93
community’s balance between freedom and security.

But from the wider political standpoint, the premise
that what judges do can be morally problematic is
uncontroversial: one need only consider the normative
criticism of judicial lawmaking in the context of
constitutional adjudication and judicial review, where it is
largely accepted that there is at least a presumptive
problem with judges making law through their own
processes of moral reasoning, unencumbered by the
constraints of democratic accountability.94 In the context of
judicial review of legislation, judicial lawmaking is heavily
91. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Belknap Press of Harvard
Univ. Press 2009) (1909).
92. Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225 (2001).
93. Id. at 1272-73 (internal citations omitted).
94. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-28 (2d
ed. 1986); Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 49-63 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997);
Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J.
1346, 1349 (2005) (citing the locus classicus of the idea in John Locke, The
Second Treatise of Government, in LOCKE: TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 265
(Peter Laslett ed., 1988)).
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criticized on this basis, but, at least in that context, judges
are working with a set of constitutionally enumerated
rights, rather than simply deciding what interests are
sufficiently morally important to warrant limiting the
state’s legal actions. In the constitutional context, then,
judges are not given wholesale discretion to decide which
human interests warrant protection as rights against the
state.
If political philosophy is not going to somehow directly
design the institution of tort, and judges—at least those in
higher courts—are famously unaccountable to the general
public, then, in the face of reasonable disagreement about
which interests ought to generate basic personal rights
against other persons, what decision procedure would
justify the selection of interests for tort to protect as rights?
At a minimum, it would seem clear that the decision
procedure ought to have some public accountability and be
reached through a process that can resolve or override
disagreement in a normatively plausible way. Is tort
justified on these criteria?
Some judges are, in some places, elected. Does that
justify their decisions as democratically grounded? It may
improve the normative pedigree of judicial decision making,
but elected judges are bound by precedential rules just as
unelected ones are.95 That leaves us, again, with the set of
interests elected for protection by tort over several centuries
of legal history. The common law is, at least in the AngloAmerican tradition, subject to the principle of
parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom and
Canada, or legislative supremacy in the United States. The
democratically elected government can, according to this
principle, revise or overturn rules developed by common law
judges; does this justify the existing set of interests
protected by tort law? Perhaps this gives the selection of
interests a measure of justifiability, but it is a feeble one: it
says only that if parliaments didn’t like the interests courts
selected, they could have changed them. But revising the
interests tort protects would require a kind of systematic
95. Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory of “Stare Decisis”, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 125,
129 (1972) (noting that, regardless of being elected or unelected, “[l]egal
discourse in the style of stare decisis . . . [is] an instance of communication with
extremely high levels of redundancy” paying homage to the rules set in prior
decisions).
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overhaul of institutions that have predated virtually every
legislature in memory. In fact, many jurisdictions around
the world have made this kind of revision, but they have
done so in a way that drastically underspecified how the
interests are to be weighed against existing private law
rights, and, most problematically, in a way that left
virtually all the decision-making up to judges.96 This,
perhaps for reasons of path-dependence, has resulted in
significant judicial deference to the status quo of private
law. It seems, then, that democratic accountability might be
enough to justify the set of interests protected by tort, if the
legislature were involved ab initio in the normative question
of institutional design that is our present concern. But
because of the kinds of potential problems of pathdependence and deference to historical authority, it is
impossible to infer the democratic approval of the existing
state of affairs in the tort system from the mere failure of
legislatures to have so far revised the rules.
This might appear to leave us in a kind of no man’s
land: if we have no access to a set of interests approved by
the public through a normatively creditable decision
procedure, and political philosophers cannot in fact decide,
then perhaps the matter is best left with judges. On some
views, after all, political morality is precisely what
constitutes the work of (at least the best) judges.97 This way
of thinking, though, as applied to the context of justifying
tort’s status quo on the basis of its judicially determined
provenance, fails to appreciate the fact that we do have a
set of interests set out as morally important, and as the
subject of public moral commitment, by a public decision
procedure, and a super-majoritarian one at that. Famously,
constitutions are possible only at particular kinds of
96. For a discussion of this problem in the tort law of Ireland, for example,
after the inception of a ‘direct’ constitutional tort, see Colm O’Cinneide, Ireland:
Irish Constitutional Law and Direct Horizontal Effect—A Successful
Experiment?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE SPHERE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
227, 228-30 (Dawn Oliver & Jorg Fedtke eds., 2007); BRYAN MCMAHON &
WILLIAM BINCHY, LAW OF TORTS (Butterworths, 3d ed., 2000). He argues, for
example, that “the impact of the direct horizontal effect doctrine has often been
muted and even nullified by the adoption of a cautious approach by the judiciary
towards developing private law remedies to reflect rights norms, in particular
where existing private law rules clearly apply to the matter at issue.”
O’Cinneide, supra note 96, at 215.
97. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255-58 (1986).
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moments in political history, where there is a certain
sufficient alignment of at least some views. They are
revisable only by super-majorities, and they are taken to
enumerate and protect the interests that are understood to
be essential in some way for every citizen in society—that is
why the interests they protect as rights are put above or
outside of the ordinary political process and cannot be
infringed, even by democratic majorities.98 So we are back to
the best real-world option available as a source of
institutional design for a system that establishes the basic
rights and obligations of persons ‘as such’ in a society: the
interests elevated to rights-status in publically enacted bills
of rights. The answer to the procedural question points to
the super-majoritarian, constitutive decision procedure by
which the content of bills of rights is arrived at, so that, in
the end, the substantive and the procedural question
appear, in this case, to point in the same direction. If I am
right about the plausibility of either one of these arguments,
or if both are at least minimally plausible, then I am also
right that tort could justifiably deviate, in the interests it
protects, from those set out in bills of rights only if they can
explicitly justify that deviation.
C. Meeting the Burden: Tort Theory and Possible
Justifications of the Status Quo
As discussed above, the debate within tort theory about
what normatively justifies tort law is dominated by two
main types of accounts, namely, the loss-based and the one
grounded in corrective justice. The civil recourse account of
tort is different from the corrective justice accounts, but
insofar as it relies on the idea that tort rectifies wrongs
(albeit legal ones), it, too, stands in opposition to the
economists. There are by now compelling arguments on all
sides for the explanatory merits of each theory, as well as
for the demerits of the other. Because my project here is
primarily normative, it will be unnecessary for me to repeat
in any detail the explanatory arguments put forward by
these two families of theories against one another. I will
98. This is most clearly true in the case of jurisdictions that Waldron refers to
as having ‘strong’ rather than ‘weak’ judicial review, meaning that
constitutional courts can read down, strike out, or invalidate, democratically
enacted legislation. See Waldron, supra note 94.
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leave behind the explanatory weaknesses each type of
theory identifies in the other and put forward my own chief
argument against both types of theory, namely that, once
outside the narrow realm of legal theory, the normative
assumptions and claims of both are unjustified from a
wider, political perspective.
Let us review the criteria we have so far established for
evaluating possible justifications of tort rules and, in
particular, of the narrow, proprietary range of interests
they protect. First, we must assume disagreement because a
range of plausible views about the appropriate content of
tort rights is available. In the face of that disagreement, is
there a principle that can justify the status quo? Second,
from the substantive argument, I concluded that such a
justification would have to respond directly to the
presumption in favor of protecting the interests set out in
bills of rights. Why, in other words, ought tort prioritize
primarily the proprietary and physical interests of persons?
Third, from the procedural argument, can the principle
proposed to justify the status quo of tort’s protected
interests be justified by its procedural pedigree? Was it
arrived at through, or accountable to, for example, a
democratic or even a super-majoritarian decision procedure?
I will first consider the norms generated through the
broadly economic interpretive approach, and then move on
to the principles to be found in some version of corrective
justice theory.
Before proceeding, though, I need to make a brief
methodological clarification. My question is which interests
tort ought to protect—it is a wholly normative one. And in
each branch of tort theory there is at least one major view
that also takes its project to be normative. But most tort
theorists claim to be doing something much more
descriptive: they insist, for the most part, that their projects
are at least primarily explanatory.99 The major existing
99. In the context of economic analysis of accident law, Posner and Shavell
make claims that are, at least to some degree, supposed to indicate that tort law
would be better if it proceeded according to their frameworks of analysis. For the
argument that Shavell’s project is normative, see Hershovitz, supra note 10, at
75-76. In the context of corrective justice, Weinrib makes a normative claim for
that principle as justifying tort law in a way that Coleman, for example,
attempts to distance himself from. For some discussion of the nuances of claims
of normativity among various tort theorists, see, e.g., Gardner, supra note 52.

2013]WHICH INTERESTS SHOULD TORT PROTECT 47
proposals seek to explain the existing set of interests
protected by tort rights. The major theories of tort, in other
words, because they are chiefly explanatory, are not
inclined toward reform.
Yet they claim that they are telling us what gives
coherence to the category of tort, and what principled basis
lies behind that coherence. Tort theories thus give
principled explanations for the status quo of tort law; for
the most part, they find that status quo to be at least
coherent, and, in some cases, also to be fully morally
justified. It is true, therefore, that each of them takes itself
to be doing something more than simply explaining the
status quo, because each one is, in effect, also generating a
metric by which future tort rules (including reform
proposals) ought to be judged, if the existing category of tort
is to be preserved.100
This claim about a principled, and in some cases
morally justified, coherent basis to the status quo makes the
theories appropriate, at least as candidate proposals in
answer to my normative question. At the end of this section
I will describe a different, and much more diffuse set of
views that are primarily aimed at the normative question,
rather than the explanatory, and I will, in large part, argue
that this reformist outlook gives the only plausibly
justifiable answer to the normative question.
With that point of methodology straightened out, I can
now inquire whether the major theories of tort hold
justifications for the existing set of interests tort law
protects that can stand up to the criteria of justification I
have so far set out, namely, reasonable moral disagreement
and the consequent presumptive priority of public moral
commitments to enumerated valuable interests.
1. Law and Economics. There are two ways of thinking
about the normative economic analysis of tort. On either
account, I will argue, the existing selection of interests

100. On both sides of the loss/wrong distinction, theorists are making claims
that are to some degree explicitly normative. On the corrective justice side,
Weinrib’s claims are the most straightforwardly normative. On the law and
economics side, as Coleman points out, Landes and Posner “clearly present their
claims on behalf of economic efficiency as both positive and normative.”
Coleman, supra note 21, at 1236, 1247.
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protected by tort is normatively unjustified.101 The first type
of economic account is the one that assumes that the
relevant normative basis on which tort should select
interests for protection, and design its rules, is the
minimization of accident costs, the maximization of wealth,
or the maximization of welfare through the efficient
allocation of the social costs associated with productive risktaking. This type of economic analysis of law assumes a
normative goal—the efficient allocation of cost and risk—
and takes up a consequentialist mode of reasoning that
operates to promote that goal. This is the normative basis of
much of the economic theorizing about, and teaching of,
tort. What interests does it propose that tort should protect?
To the extent that it assumes a norm like economic
efficiency, we might say that it protects people’s interest in
cost minimization; or, conversely, people’s interest in having
social wealth maximized. More specifically, we might say
that it protects an interest in the efficient allocation of risk
or loss. In the ex ante hypothetical agreement that some
economists suggest to be at the basis of the best tort rules,
we must assume that the parties to that agreement have
some of their own interests in mind, and that they would
agree, rationally, to the most efficient allocation of risks to
those interests. But even accepting this hypothetical
agreement premise, in order to also endorse economists’
justification of tort’s existing protected interests, we also
have to accept that, in their hypothetical agreement, the
101. Weinrib’s arguments against loss-based theories of tort are partly in this
vein. He calls these theories ‘functionalist,’ since they take tort to be evaluable
according to how well it functions in promoting certain ends which we take to be
valuable. The most commonly asserted ends for tort include the compensation of
injury, the deterrence of accidents, and the minimization of the social costs of
accidents. Weinrib, among other anti-functionalists, to borrow this language,
does not object to the idea that the goals of compensation, deterrence and
efficiency may well be valuable, or also, presumably, that some body of law
might be designed to promote them. His objection is that tort law does not exist
in service of these or any other ends that are external to it. So Weinrib shares
my concern that tort law is not necessarily or intrinsically connected to the ends
suggested by loss-based theorists. Weinrib goes further, though, because he
claims that tort law, as it has been developed as a legal institution, is in fact its
own end, and thus requires no further justification: he claims that tort law is
itself a justificatory enterprise. See WEINRIB, supra note 5.
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parties were either constrained in the set of interests about
which they were making an agreement (namely, those in
person and property), or that they actually value those
interests and the most efficient allocation of risk to them,
above others, such as interests in antidiscrimination,
various freedoms such as conscience, religion and thought,
and possibly interests in welfare that would manifest a
concern to establish obligations of minimal beneficence.
But there is nothing in the idea of a hypothetical ex
ante agreement that points in favor of either of those last
two bases, on which the parties would select the interests
economists espouse as tort’s underlying norm (either
descriptively or normatively). So, instead, economists of this
type must be assuming that the efficient allocation of risks,
and certain types of costs, is a valid social goal.
What justifies the selection of efficiency as an
appropriate norm with which to legally regulate our
interpersonal interactions?102 Why not other norms?
Efficiency may be valuable, and the costs associated with
accidents ought, perhaps, to be minimized by lawmakers.
But even assuming that to be true, it does not explain what
role other norms ought to play in the setting out of
interpersonal obligations, if any—or, if efficiency is to be the
dominant norm governing interaction, why that should be
the case.103 The social goal selected as normative by
economic theorists of tort is not obviously the appropriate
102. Coleman points out that “Landes and Posner present no systematic
defense of the normative claims of efficiency.” Coleman, supra note 21, at 1236.
Hershovitz argues that we might well have a moral intuition that runs contrary
the logic of the hand formula if “when the risk of harm is substantial, we judge
others responsible for our injuries even if the costs of the precautions they might
have taken exceeded our expected loss.” In other words, we might have the
intuition that if some activity risks injuring me in a way that would not
necessarily be quantified to a high monetary amount, and risk is relatively
likely to occur, but, say, the cost of preventing it is for some technical reason
extremely high, then the defendant still ought to take the care to avoid harming
me in that way. See Hershovitz, supra note 10, at 83.
103. For the specific criticism that wealth maximization is not an appropriate
value to guide lawmaking, see Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Anthony Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a
Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980). Posner replies to these
arguments in the same volume. Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Reply
to Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1980).
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social goal to exclusively refer to in selecting the interests
tort protects, from a liberal standpoint, and it is not,
moreover, justified by a public decision procedure.
More sophisticated economists, though, might say that
their method is simply responsive to the norms set out by
lawmakers. So, for example, however unpalatable it might
seem to treat the deterrence of sexual battery as an aim to
be pursued through incentivization mechanisms, it is a
sufficiently good thing that sexual battery be minimized
that such an approach is warranted.
Perhaps, then, we might think that the pursuit of
certain social goals is so important that it warrants the
establishment of individual rights and obligations. In other
words, what if we don’t think that moral rights ought to
determine the content of interpersonal obligations? What if
we think tort law ought to pursue some social goal, like
wealth maximization or, perhaps more compellingly,
maximization of welfare? Taking such a consequentialist
view, one could still retain some of tort’s institutional
features, such as its bilateralism, because tort can
operationalize some type of rule-consequentialism, and can
still be constituted by legal rights, even if it does not
recognize that individuals have first-order moral ones.
If we assume that the norm selected for promotion is a
plausible one (such as the minimization of loss, or its
efficient allocation), the theory still fails to justify the
selection of interests tort protects, because many types of
losses (individual and social) might be candidates for
minimization. But which ones are justifiably selected by tort
for protection as rights? Loss, in other words, to what?
One candidate social goal that seems perhaps the most
plausible from the standpoint of liberal theory is the
promotion—and perhaps even the appropriately distributed
promotion—of welfare. If we take welfare, here, to mean
human wellbeing understood in a more intuitive way than
through the lens of welfare economics, its protection by tort
law seems plausible. Even if we interpret tort’s purpose as
justified in these terms, though, the problem is that the
welfare-promoting principle leaves open the question of how
human wellbeing is to be understood and defined. Are we to
take it to be symbolized by wealth? On an interest-based
account of rights, tort rights might look very plausible in
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these terms, since interests are understood to be aspects of
wellbeing.104 But which aspects of well-being—the question
comes back—constitute the most important facets of it? Any
consequentialist mode of moral or legal reasoning must
operate with a goal, a good toward which we can reason or
design rules. The definition of that goal, in this context,
must be justified against reasonable disagreement: the
selection of welfare as a candidate good is, therefore, underdeterminate. And, in fact, if we do look to public moral
commitments, and public political morality, to identify those
aspects of human life that have been specified as those most
closely connected to wellbeing—most important to protect—
we seem to come back, unavoidably, to the interests
enumerated in bills of rights and as basic liberties by
liberals. Even if we do not interpret those interests as
requiring that tort protect them as first order moral rights,
in other words, if we look instead for a publicly justifiable
set of interests to specify the content of welfare as a social
goal, the importance of those interests seems to create a
presumption against the justifiability of tort law’s existing
limitation of protected interests to those in physical person
and property.
Furthermore, and finally, I want to suggest that the
consequentialist view is, for the design of tort law, morally
problematic if it does not allow for the protection of
individual moral rights within its institutional structure.
The structure of the consequentialist approach is
normatively problematic: individuals’ experiences and
claims are treated, in this type of view, as instruments in
the pursuit of social policy. This is problematic from a
number of perspectives; one of which is that it treats
individuals as means toward an end. Moreover, and more
particularly, it disregards the basic liberal assumption that
the pursuit of social goals must be, to some extent,
constrained by individual rights.
Even if we accept, therefore, that the social goal tort law
justifiably promotes is that of efficiency—wealth
maximization through the minimization of costs—or some
other welfare-based goal, we still need something else to
justify the coercive force of the institution, particularly
given the involuntary character of its obligations. This is
simply because of the myriad arguments made in a variety
104. Raz defines interests in these terms. See RAZ, supra note 59, at 166.
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of contexts against a utilitarian pursuit of social aims at the
unequal expense of certain individuals.105 According to most
theories of justice, and according to the moral commitments
of most liberal societies, the coercive pursuit of social goals
requires that individual rights be protected from the unfair
effects and unfair distributional consequences of
majoritarian action, in order for the state’s actions to be
morally justified. This is the role constitutional rights play
in the legitimation of action taken by the state in pursuit of
its goals.
There is an analogous structure in the institutions of
the private sphere that requires us to interpret them as
protecting individual moral rights, at least at some level. To
grant the economists’ position for a moment, if tort’s
governing norm ought to be the social minimization of
accident costs, then the cost outcome for society is what will
determine whether the victim of someone else’s carelessness
or bad behavior will have to bear the cost of his or her own
losses. But why ought that person, that particular plaintiff,
bear a greater burden of society’s having its accident costs
minimized than others who were not similarly injured? It
seems like an instance of unequal outcomes that are
unjustified because they are brought about by luck. Society
may benefit from the minimization of accident costs through
rules whose content is determined by efficiency
considerations, but the individual plaintiff will likely bear
more of the burden of that cost (her own loss) than what her
share of the social benefit would be. Making tort law’s rules
with an eye to promoting some social goal, without
attending to the unfair effects on individuals, in other
words, seems normatively unjustified, even if we do accept
the importance of the social goal.
2. Corrective Justice. In this section, I will argue that
corrective justice, like economic analysis, unjustifiably
approves, either implicitly or explicitly, of the existing

105. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7-8 (1996) (noting that because of the Bill of Rights in
the United States, “government must treat all those subject to its dominion as
having equal moral and political status” and must treat them all equally);
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at vii (1977) (defining and
defending a Dworkin’s own “liberal theory of law,” while distinguishing it from,
and criticizing, utilitarianism and legal positivism).
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selection of interests tort law protects.106 The fully
normative corrective justice accounts identify certain
normatively valuable institutional features of tort, and then
extrapolate from that analysis to argue for a certain ideal
content of the rules themselves. In the case of corrective
justice, the normative attractiveness of tort’s protection of
individual rights, and its bilateral structure of complaint
and compensation, is taken to embody a much more
substantive normative principle of the protection of equal
freedom or Kantian juridical rights of external freedom. The
existing practice is viewed as, at least, approximately107 or
partly embodying the appropriate balance of freedom, and
since external freedom is protected through noninterference
with person and property, the theory implies that there is
no reason to include other interests in the protections tort
offers individuals.
This fundamentally normative account of tort’s proper
content as protecting equal freedom and equal moral status,
and instantiating the Kantian ‘external freedoms,’ is
106. This is true of accounts that take their explanatory argument to imply
something normative about the content of tort rules. As Coleman points out, a
strictly explanatory account, one with no ostensible normative implications, is
possible: “the defensibility of corrective justice as a moral ideal is . . .
independent of its role in explaining tort law.” See COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF
PRINCIPLE, supra note 23, at 5. It is also true of accounts of corrective justice
that justify the institution of tort according to one version of that principle. See
Alan Calnan, In Defense of the Liberal Justice Theory of Torts: A Reply to
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky, 1 N.Y.U J.L. & LIBERTY 1023, 1037 (2005)
(discussing the attempt to justify tort according to non-normative principles).
Those who closely follow the Aristotelian principle of reparation, for example, or
those who accept an argument like Weinrib’s about the role of Kantian Right to
tort, will limit the range of interests tort can justifiably protect by reference to
proprietary rights, or to interests that can be construed as relevantly similar to
proprietary ones. See Perry, supra note 42, at 456-60 (discussing Richard
Epstein’s argument along these lines); see also Richard A. Epstein, Causation
and Corrective Justice, A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477, 499-500
(1979) (claiming that strict liability is entailed by the concept of property).
107. I acknowledge that there is a fairly significant diversity of views about
what exactly corrective justice is, as well as to what extent tort law does or
ought to embody it, and, further, about whether tort law can or does only
perform corrective justice. But since my question is a normative one, my claim
here is only about the view to the extent that it has normative implications, and
so I do not regard that diversity within corrective justice theories as relevant for
my purpose here.
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Weinrib’s version of corrective justice.108 Coleman’s ‘mixed’
account of corrective justice defines rights (and thus limits
the included losses) by reference to the setback to interests,
which he circumscribes by reference to ones that are
‘legitimate’ and especially important.109 This suggests that
the existing privileging of certain interests by judges within
tort law could be fully justified—if ‘legitimate’ and
important interests are construed as negative proprietary
ones, or as the kind of interest somehow ‘appropriate’ to tort
law, meaning something like ‘conventional within’—
although his account does not explain why this would be the
case.
To view private law in terms of corrective justice is to
treat as settled certain moral and political questions that
are not settled, such as the moral status of property—
whether, for example, property rights are ‘natural’ and
prepolitical or conventional, and, in particular, the role that
property rights ought to play in relation to other rights and
values. One might think there is a moral truth of the matter
in this question, but assuming we think that some type of
property rights are in some way morally justified, and that
other rights (such as human rights) are also morally
justified, this leaves room for reasonable disagreement
about the correct balance to be struck between these two
types of rights in general.
It counts presumptively against the account offered by
corrective justice that that view does not include certain
interests that are the subject of public commitments.
Consider, for example, a few interests for which it seems at
least plausible that justice, however construed, might well
require or at least permit that certain interests be enforced
through the legal obligations imposed on interpersonal
interactions.
One such interest is equality, even if only in the form of
nondiscrimination, rather than in that of resource
distribution. Theorists who take a corrective justice view of
tort argue that it cannot coherently protect this interest,
and thus that the creation of a new cause of action for

108. See discussion infra pp. 13-14 and accompanying footnotes.
109. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 22, at 369-71; Perry, supra
note 33, at 926-31.
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nondiscrimination would be unjustified.110 But if this
argument is made on the basis of an interpretation of the
existing practice, it seems less convincing from the point of
view of a larger political perspective. If the protection of
individual equality, through the legal prohibition of
discrimination, is sufficiently important, from the
standpoint of political morality, then it would seem that
there is at least a prima facie case for that protection at all
levels of society and through a variety of institutions,
including private law.111 An argument against the protection
of those interests that is based on the existing practice of
the institution seems to privilege existing practice
unjustifiably.
Another interest rejected for tort protection by
corrective justice is a minimal obligation to aid or rescue.112
Much is made, in the literature on corrective justice, of the
common law distinction between malfeasance (doing
something wrong) and nonfeasance (not doing anything), so
that the line separating these two effectively becomes the
way interests are selected for protection by tort law.113 But
there are a number of jurisdictions, particularly outside the
common law world, in which, if it would be costless or near
costless for Smith to rescue Jones from death or terrible
harm, and Smith fails to do so, Jones (or Jones’s estate) can
sue Smith under private law. In effect, then, lawmakers in
those places have decided that the obligation of costless
rescue is one that the society values sufficiently, for one
reason or another, to impose it on its members. Now, this is
not an argument that costless rescue ought, as a matter of
justice, to be imposed everywhere as an obligation on
110. For an argument to this effect, see Benson, supra note 71, at 201-45.
111. One way to construct antidiscrimination as a personal right (or a
correlative wrong) is suggested by Sophia Moreau’s argument that
antidiscrimination laws protect people’s “deliberative freedoms.” Sophia
Moreau, What is Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 111, 143 (2010). One
could interpret this idea as an interest that society has reason to value.
112. See WEINRIB, supra note 5, at xii and 10; see generally Ernest J. Weinrib,
The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980) (advocating for a duty to
rescue).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (“The rule [that there is no
affirmative duty to rescue] is applicable irrespective of the gravity of the danger
to which the other is subjected and the insignificance of the trouble, effort, or
expense of giving him aid or protection.”).
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individuals; rather, it is to show that there are interests and
obligations that a society could reasonably choose to impose,
and that are sometimes legislatively imposed, which are
excluded from corrective justice.
Corrective justice theorists are, for the most part, quite
clear that there is a certain openness about which interests
ought to be protected as rights within the theory of
corrective justice, or about which interests tort ought to
protect in addition to performing corrective justice. This
openness is unfortunately quite unhelpful for the purpose of
answering the question at hand. On one hand, we have
Weinrib’s view, which is the least open on this score. His is
the most explicit about the way corrective justice fully
specifies the content of the rights it protects, and he is clear
that tort law is the embodiment of corrective justice, so that,
whatever else a society chooses to do to protect
interpersonal rights and obligations, it ought not call those
that fall outside the purview of corrective justice “tort
law.”114 Other theorists take it that tort could be inclusive of
other interests and still also have the purpose and function
of performing corrective justice.115 But even within
corrective justice, there is some possible openness about
which interests ought to be protected: Jules Coleman’s
conception of corrective justice—the mixed conception—
takes an interest-based theory of rights as part of the basis
for the theory.116 His view—limited to this particular
question—is that corrective justice protects rights conceived
of as ‘legitimate’ interests, as noted above. So it is possible
to espouse some version of the structure of corrective justice,
in the form of the view that simply says that where someone
has committed a wrong by violating someone’s right, that
person is responsible for doing something for the wronged
person in recognition of that wrong. This is to put the
matter extremely broadly, but my point is only that it might
be the case that one could give some kind of corrective
justice account of tort that protected some set of interests
specified in the way I have in mind.

114. For Weinrib’s discussion of the categorical distinction between corrective
justice as tort’s immanent rationality and other social or political goals, see
WEINRIB, supra note 5, at 210-213.
115. See Gardner, supra note 52.
116. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 22, at 369-71.
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3. Is Corrective Justice Especially Receptive to
Constitutive Interests? In an article written with the
constitutional scholar Lorraine Weinrib, Ernest Weinrib
addresses directly a question very close to the one I am
suggesting is incumbent on corrective justice theorists to
answer, namely, how tort law conceived of as instantiating
corrective justice can be justified in the face of the public
moral commitments made in constitutional societies.117 I will
argue that the answer Weinrib and Weinrib give is an
illuminating illustration of the limitations of a conception of
tort grounded in the normative version of corrective justice
to justify its particular existing selection of interests,
against a background of publically enumerated rights.118
Although they share many of the views I argued for in the
previous section about the moral importance of the
constitutionally enumerated interests,119 I will show that
even when taking on the justificatory challenge directly, the
conception of tort as corrective justice in fact cannot meet
the burden of justifying its existing selection of interests.
The argument Weinrib and Weinrib make is that tort
conceived of in terms of corrective justice is fundamentally
receptive to what they call ‘Charter values,’ and can thus
include at least several of the interests enumerated in the
Canadian bill of rights, known as the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.120 The ‘receptivity’ of corrective justice to Charter
values is, they claim, due to two major features of private
law when viewed as manifesting corrective justice.
The first is that both private law, conceived of in this
way, and constitutional rights, in the Canadian Charter
scheme, are systems of individual rights whose violations
must be proved to be proportional.121 Private law can thus
conceivably include a wider range of interests as rights.
Whereas Charter rights must be balanced with the
legitimate pursuits of the government, and with other
rights, within a free and democratic society, Weinrib and
117. Weinrib & Weinrib, supra note 5, at 46-47.
118. Id. at 43-72.
119. Id. at 49.
120. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C,
1985, app. II, no. 44; see also id. at §§ 1-34.
121. Weinrib & Weinrib, supra note 5, at 50-58.

58

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

Weinrib claim that private law can similarly balance the
proportionality of the rights it protects according to the
centrality or marginality of the infringement to the parties’
respective interests.122 An infringement of a more central
aspect of an interest will take priority over an infringement
of a more marginal one.123 This proportionality, they argue,
allows the inclusion of new Charter rights within private
law to be accomplished while maintaining the “fundamental
moral impulse”124 of the latter. That fundamental impulse is
to preserve what is called the “transactional equality” of the
parties.125 The idea here is that liability must be determined
by reference to the normative position of both parties,
rather than only of the plaintiff—as it would be in the case
of exclusively compensating the plaintiff—or of the
defendant—as it would be in the case of exclusively
promoting deterrence.126 They point to tort’s use of a fault
standard rather than a strict liability one as an illustration
of transactional fairness.127
The analogy between private law as corrective justice
and constitutional rights in which both are proportional
systems of rights protection is one basis of the receptivity of
corrective justice to Charter values; but it is a fairly general
one. The more specific basis on which Weinrib and Weinrib
claim that corrective justice can be receptive to public law
values involves corrective justice’s Kantian basis.128 The
development of private law in accordance with corrective
justice, they argue, is an exercise in public reason. 129 As
such, it is receptive to Charter values in terms of content,
rather than only in terms of structure. This view of private
law as public reason involves three Kantian stages, or
“moments.” The first is the conception of the person:
The person in private law is a self-determining agent
characterised solely by the capacity for purposive action without
122. Id. at 58.
123. Id. at 58.
124. Id. at 52.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 53.
128. See id. at 47.
129. Id.
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being obligated to act for any purpose in particular. This capacity
for purposiveness is the basis for ascribing dignity to every selfdetermining agent and is presupposed in the law’s notions of
imputability and entitlement. By virtue of one’s self-determining
agency, a person has the normative status to assert one’s dignity
in relation to others and therefore to be an end and not merely a
means for them. Rights are the juridical embodiment of the
130
dignity inherent in self-determining agency.

The second stage is what they call “the ensemble of
juridical categories that express [the] rights and duties”
associated with dignity as self-determining agency and
freedom, respectively “in the interaction of one person with
another.”131 This stage follows from the first in that the
conception of the person exclusively in terms of selfdetermining agency—“a capacity for purposiveness without
regard to particular purposes”—requires that “the
relationships of private law are defined in terms of noninterference with the rights of others.”132 Moreover, they
argue that the rights of the person at private law are
necessarily the ones that reflect purposive agency not
merely as “an inward attribute” but externally as well, thus
giving rise to “the right to the integrity of one’s body as the
organ of purposive activity, the right to property in things
appropriately connected to an external manifestation of the
proprietor’s volition, and the right to contractual
performance in accordance with the mutually consensual
exercises of the parties’ purposiveness.”133
In other words, the conception of the person at the first
stage gives rise, at the second stage, to at least the rights of
person and property we find as the interests tort law
currently selects to protect. The third stage is the
requirement of public institutions to give content to, and
enforce, the rights of the person at private law.134 It is at
this stage that Weinrib and Weinrib argue that judges can
interpolate Charter values into the content of private law

130. Id. at 47.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 48.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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rights.135 This is because the court, as an “institution of
public reason, view[s] the litigants as participants in a
social relationship within a world of shared social
meanings.”136 It is largely this part of their argument that I
agree with: Weinrib and Weinrib argue that because the
Constitution commits the legal order to the priority of
human dignity and enumerates the constituents of dignity
for political purposes, constitutional values are available for
specifying the incidents of dignity included within private
law. The Constitution, as society’s authoritative repository
of legally supreme and publicly accessible values concerning
human dignity, is a preeminent source on which public
reason can draw as it gives concrete meaning to the
categories that comprise private law.137
This description of the importance of constitutional
values makes the view seem entirely consonant with the
one I have so far been arguing for. It makes it appear as
though we can, in fact, conceive of tort in terms of corrective
justice, and include constitutionally enumerated interests
within tort’s protection, thus justifying it against the
presumptions and requirements of pluralism and
disagreement. In fact, based on this argument, it looks as
though we ought to adopt a version of corrective justice
precisely because of its apparent receptiveness to the
interests being elevated to constitutional rights. In fact,
however, this view is based on certain controversial
assumptions.
The first and most general assumption in Weinrib and
Weinrib’s argument for private law’s receptiveness to
Charter values is that private law is a fundamentally moral
enterprise. The argument is thus grounded in a
nonpositivist basis.138 In other words, the argument is not,
135. Id. at 48-49.
136. Id. at 48.
137. Id. at 49.
138. For an argument against this kind of ‘immanent critique,’ see generally
Barbara Fried, The Limits of a Non-Consequentialist Approach to Torts, 18
LEGAL THEORY 231, 236-37 (2012). For an example of a discussion of, and
argument against, formalist nonpositivism, see generally G. Brencher IV,
Formalism, Positivism, and Natural Law in Ernest Weinrib’s Tort Theory—Will
the Real Ernest Weinrib Please Come Forward, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 318 (1992).
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as I would have it, that private law ought to be
conceptualized and designed in a way that reflects the
public political and moral commitments of liberal society,
but rather that the corrective justice-conceptualization
happens to coincide with a rights-based view of the person
and shares the Charter’s commitment to dignity. For legal
positivists, there is no special reason for thinking that the
personhood described by judges in private law cases ought
to have any particular normative status when it comes to
the broader political perspective of institutional design.
Furthermore, being a legal positivist, I might well think
that in the absence of the kind of legal directive—even the
very weak one—found in the Canadian constitutional
context, there is no legal basis, of the kind of argument
Weinrib and Weinrib give, for altering the prioritization of
protected interests in tort law.
The second problematic assumption in Weinrib and
Weinrib’s argument for corrective justice’s receptivity to
Charter values involves the conception of public reason on
which they rely. They are explicit that the private law
judge’s reasoning is public, insofar as it refers to normative
considerations that are properly respectful of, and equal in
their application to, both parties, and that both parties can
reasonably accept; they claim that this reasoning is not
based, at this third stage, on philosophical reflection. 139 That
may be the case, but the public reasoning they describe is,
overall, almost entirely based on philosophical reflection. At
the second Kantian stage, the rights required in respect of
purposive personhood are properly derivable from
“reflections on the implications of self-determining
agency.”140 This kind of ‘reflection’ is certainly philosophical,
and, if it is indeed a form of public reasoning, it is, as far as
I’m concerned, the wrong kind of public reason from which
to design a fundamental institution in liberal culture, and
this is true, it seems to me, although it is supposed to align
with Rawlsian public reason: within a society actually
ordered by justice as fairness, and thus well-ordered, it may
be possible for judges to reason exclusively deontologically
in this way, but in a non-ideal context this seems
139. Weinrib & Weinrib, supra note 5, at 49 (“The specific content of the
rights is derived, not through philosophical speculation, but through reference
to beliefs, values, and modes of reasoning that have public plausibility.”).
140. Id. at 48.
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insufficiently advertent to the interests expressed as basic
to liberal justice through public moral commitments.
This concern about the type of reasoning advocated in
Weinrib and Weinrib’s view brings me to the third problem.
The reasoning flows from a particular conception of the
person. That conception is a morally non-neutral one, and it
is also not the one described by the incidents of dignified
personhood in liberal bills of rights. It represents, rather,
the will-based, Kantian morality that Rawls eventually set
aside for his own conception of justice in favor of political
liberalism. This is a conception based on agency alone; it
does not even include the sense of justice that Rawls’ moral
person does.141
Weinrib and Weinrib claim that private law is receptive
to Charter values partly because both private and
constitutional law are fundamentally animated by the
moral premise of human dignity.142 And, although they say
that the interests enumerated in the bill of rights can be
considered to be the legally recognized constituents of
dignity, those constituents can only enter the analysis after
the existing prioritization of physical integrity and property
in tort rights has been established.143 The conceptual
content of dignity is thus hijacked and held hostage by that
conception of the person: the enumerated interests in the
bill of rights is taken to flesh out, for the private law
context, only that conception of dignity. The interests
protected by tort’s status quo are, in this view, given
priority. The Charter values are introduced, revealingly, at
the third Kantian stage—after the fundamental rights and
duties of person, property and contract have been
established as necessary to the embodiment of dignity for
the purposive, self-reflective agent.144 If one wants to design
a set of institutions according to one’s comprehensive moral
141. The status of the conception of the person found in the immanent analysis
of private law is problematic as well, it seems to me, for a view like that of Mayo
Moran, who takes the private law in general to contribute to a conception of the
person within society that includes the publically enumerated interests and the
moral view she takes to be immanent in private law. Mayo Moran, The Mutually
Constitutive Nature of Public and Private Law, in THE GOALS OF PRIVATE LAW
(Andrew Robertson & Tang Hang Wu eds., 2009).
142. Weinrib & Weinrib, supra note 5, at 49.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 48.
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view, delineating a particular conception of the person is a
good place to start. This conception of the person is one with
which, it seems to me, more libertarians than socialists
would agree with. Now, private law ought not be a socialist
enterprise, but it also ought not appeal particularly to those
of a particular political persuasion unless that persuasion
can be justified directly against the conception of the person
thrown into relief by the widely agreed-upon bills of rights
themselves.
Weinrib and Weinrib give three main examples of new
causes of action that could be created in reflection of
Charter values under a corrective justice conception of
tort.145 These involve freedom of expression in the context of
property rights, a new tort of discrimination, and public
policy in the context of testamentary freedom.146 It is not
actually clear, though, that the committed corrective justice
theorist would accept some of the suggestions made by
Weinrib and Weinrib. They argue, for example, that a new
tort of discrimination would be plausible under their view of
private law; but other corrective justice theorists have
expressly argued that such a tort based on public law would
be impermissible as a matter of corrective justice.147
Also, their view allows for the unreflective prioritization
of existing ‘private’ interests, such as, in their illustration,
“testamentary freedom.”148 Weinrib and Weinrib are
somewhat elliptical on the question of the relative priority
of the interests in bills of rights and private ones. They
sometimes use language that emphasizes that, even given
the legal imperative to include Charter values in common
law jurisprudence, private law still ought to be conceived of
according to its own distinctive “general imperative that
governs private law from within.”149 But sometimes they
seem to espouse the idea that existing private law
categories, and the interests they protect, are more fully
open to Charter influence, arguing, for instance, that that
means that “a new set of interests—those associated with
145. See id. at 41, 65-68.
146. See id.
147. Benson, supra note 71, at 202-05; Reichman, supra note 7, at 257, 275,
279.
148. Weinrib & Weinrib, supra note 5, at 68.
149. Id. at 52.
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the values inherent in the constitutionally guaranteed
rights—becomes eligible for legal protection.”150 To the
extent that the view takes the private law conceptualization
of the person as limited to him or her as a purposive agent,
it seems to me that the view is unjustifiably moralized in
Kantian terms, and insufficiently reflective of, and receptive
to, the interests given public moral emphasis in bills of
rights.
III. OBJECTIONS: LOSING TORT’S DISTINCTIVENESS?
Let me summarize the argument so far. As a central
rights-establishing institution, tort must justify itself
against the background of public moral commitments.
Therefore, any defensible conception of tort law must
include some respect for individual moral rights. This can be
at a fairly minimal level, requiring the kinds of constraints
on the pursuit of social goals in respect to individual rights
that we find in constitutional regulation of the state, or it
can occupy the entire space of tort’s institutional design, if
one takes the establishment and vindication of individual
moral rights to be what tort ought to be doing. My own
sympathies lie with the latter view, but the argument of
this Article is to establish only that the presumption in
respect to the interests tort ought to protect should shift to
require that its status quo be justified as a deviation from
public moral commitments to a set of personal rights.
Whatever view one takes about the fundamental purpose of
tort law, there is a question about which interests its rights
ought to protect. In other words, tort can be taken to be a
(moral) rights-protecting institution, without the content of
those rights being specified by corrective justice theory.
Assuming reasonable disagreement, the question of which
interests ought to be protected in private interactions is one
that ought to be justifiable against the background of the
set of interests most widely made subject to public moral
commitments.
Having considered the existing normative justifications
for the interests tort law protects, and having found them
inadequate on the basis of the criteria of disagreement and
the consequent necessity of publically approved or liberally
justified reasoning, my more reformist outlook is that the
150. Id. at 53.
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selection of interests grounding tort rights is a question to
be referred to, or at least informed by, the enumeration of
the interests deemed to be valuable through a means of
publically accountable and procedurally sound decisions. In
particular, and as a starting point, I contend that the
interests that are articulated as having paramount
importance, and thus being worthy of legal protection in
constitutional bills of rights and human rights instruments,
ought to be taken as presumptively authoritative on the
question of which interests are valuable enough to warrant
their protection as individual rights. In this section, I will
consider three important objections to the view I have
sketched so far; in responding to them I also hope to clarify
certain aspects of my account.
A. Constitutional Imperialism
The conception of tort I am advocating here could be
accused of something that is sometimes called
“constitutional imperialism.”151 This means that values,
principles, or structures appropriate to the public sphere
have somehow infiltrated or inappropriately begun to
dominate those in the private sphere. The objection
assumes that there is a meaningful distinction between the
public and private spheres, that such a distinction can be
usefully identified, and that, further, tort law falls on the
private side of the divide. All three of these assumptions are
either problematic or flawed, in my view, but even assuming
they are to some reasonable extent true, one can
nonetheless defend a view like mine against the objection.
My main line of defense is as follows: disagreement, and
hence the necessary presumptive prioritization of
constitutionally enumerated values, are pertinent to
determining institutional arrangements, rules, and
obligations for activities in the private sphere as much as in
the public sphere.
The imperialist charge implies that something morally
problematic is going on—an unjustified, disrespectful and
harmful invasion of some kind. That could be the case for
two reasons. First, the area being invaded—in this case tort
151. This is the phrase used by Mayo Moran in her defense of private law’s
distinctive contribution to the conception of the person in society. Moran, supra
note 141, at 18.
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law—could be equally, intrinsically, valuable in its own
right. In order for this to be convincing, the intrinsic value
in the private sphere would have to be such that it would
displace the presumptive priority of the public moral
commitments to basic rights and liberties. In Part II, I
found the justifications of tort’s prioritization of the
interests in physical integrity and property inadequate as
possible positions of this type. So this possibility is defeated
by the inadequate justification of tort’s status quo against
that public background.
Is there something distinctive about the structure and
integrity of private law? I find this somewhat implausible
from a broad political standpoint. At its foundations, tort
law is simply a set of rights and obligations—what is
distinctive about that? But perhaps there is another reason
to warrant the retention of the status quo in tort law, its
restriction to the interests it currently protects, that does
not refer to their intrinsic priority, for interpersonal
relations, over the broader range specified by public
enumeration. Perhaps there is a more instrumental reason
to keep this narrow range of proprietary interests separate,
conceptually and institutionally, in private and especially
tort law, from the encroachment of public law, public
values, or even public moral commitments. In other words,
perhaps we can helpfully reframe the question in slightly
more instrumental terms: ought there to be something, or
could there be something, usefully distinctive about private
law’s structure and integrity? It seems to me that we can
distinguish the questions of structure and integrity. I will
argue in the next section that we have moral grounds to
protect the structure of tort law, but that that need not
require nor justify protecting its integrity if doing so means
allowing the interests it currently protects to retain their
special status, resisting the justificatory pressure of the
other interests I have been arguing for.
The ‘integrity’ of tort simply cannot be invoked as a
justification for its current selection of interests. Judges
have developed tort law as though those interests were
intrinsically characteristic of tort as a legal category; that
is, to a certain extent these are the interests assumed to be
important enough to give content to individual rights and
obligations in tort because that is how tort was
understood—as a category of legal claims. But that
categorical quality is a contingent matter of history, and
things could have been otherwise.
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As an illustration of this contingency, I turn to an early
legal theorist, John Norton Pomeroy. Pomeroy’s
Introduction to Municipal Law conceived of legal categories
differently from Holmes. He divided substantive law into
three categories—persons and personal rights, property,
and contracts.152 My interest lies in his analysis of the first,
and, in particular, the section he called “general rights.”153
He divided the law not along the lines of public and private,
nor by reference to the type of remedy available, but
according to the types of interests protected by the rights he
describes.154 So civil suits for damages were included with
constitutional restrictions on legislation, and these were
distinguished from political rights, like the right to vote.
Pomeroy, then, did not treat tort as an independent legal
category, but rather thought of the important categorical
demarcation as the one between different types of interests
protected by different types of rights (private,
constitutional, etc.).155 Grey explains the ways in which
Pomeroy interpreted the law and its categories according to
the type of individual interest protected, rather than by the
division between public and private defendants:
[His] civil rights (like Blackstone’s ‘absolute rights’ of persons in
Book 1 of his Commentaries) were roughly the standard natural
rights of liberal theory: personal security, subdivided into rights to
life, body and limb, and reputation; the right to personal liberty;
the rights to acquire and enjoy private property; and finally the
156
right of religious belief and worship.

But even leaving aside the idea that tort is somehow
conceptually constituted by the interests it protects, there
are a number of reasons we might want to keep the
animating values of private law, and of tort law in
particular,
distinctively
separate
from
those
of
152. See generally JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MUNICIPAL
LAW (1865) (explaining and commenting on the whole of municipal law).
153. This was distinguished from “peculiar rights” that deal with status, which
corresponded to the Roman law of persons, and included the law of domestic
relations, for example, and master and servant. See Grey, supra note 92, at
1253-54.
154. See id. at 1254.
155. See id.
156. See id.

68

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

constitutional and human rights law, and we ought to
consider their strength.
One possibility would be the desirability of a zone of
privacy, meaning a sphere in which the animating values
are distinctively private in some way. The problem with this
idea of privacy is that the question of which values ought to
be protected is inescapable. One suggestion is that the
private sphere is the zone of individual autonomy and
freedom. People who talk about the normative ‘integrity’ of
private law often think of private law as the domain of
individual autonomy.157 But why ought this necessarily be
the case? Why would the delineation of a sphere of personal
autonomy require that that sphere be given content that
prioritizes the proprietary over political and social
interests? We can agree that freedom and autonomy are the
animating values of private law without that telling us
much about which interests ought to be taken to constitute
the kind of personal autonomy we value. Weinrib and
Weinrib have suggested that individual autonomy ought to
be first conceived of as self-determining agency requiring
the set of private law rights categories we find in its status
quo, and that the set of personal interests established as the
basis of public moral commitments could flesh out the
details of those rights.158 But one can be committed to
individual freedom, autonomy and dignity, even in the
context of private interactions, and still think that the set of
interests encompassed by those general concepts ought, at
least presumptively, to refer to the publically enumerated
set of interests constituting the person according to the
political morality of a given constitutional state. Property,
contract, and physical integrity will no doubt form part of
the set of interests we ultimately think tort ought to protect,
but they have no intrinsic priority in defining the concepts
of freedom, autonomy and dignity. One might quite
reasonably take the position that a set of positive
entitlements, and an emphasis on social equality, is the
most realistic basis for promoting everyone’s private
157. This is a broad description of the formalist, Kantian view to which
Weinrib and some other corrective justice theorists subscribe. For an example of
one who follows in Weinrib’s footsteps, see Calnan, supra note 106, at 1023.
158. See infra pp. 58, 59 and accompanying footnotes (discussion of Weinrib
and Weinrib’s claims about tort law’s “special receptivity” to constitutional
interests).
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autonomy. Or one might think that personal autonomy
consists of a libertarian conception of personal interactions.
Given that the publically enumerated set of constitutional
interests seems to emphasize a conception of personal
autonomy that prioritizes freedoms of thought, conscience,
religion, and equality, what would justify a selection of
interests for tort protection that prioritizes the proprietary
over the nonproprietary?
Why would one assume that corrective justice, as
performed by tort law, protects exactly (or nearly so) the set
of interests entrenched by tort law as a matter of contingent
history? One possible answer, I would suggest, is that they
assume it for a reason one finds in legal scholarship more
generally, namely, that tort or ‘private’ law’s distinct
institutional role is to protect prepolitical rights, which are
appropriately subject to adjudication in the common law
style.159 The argument for that position would go something
like this. People have certain rights, in a state of nature,
that are something like those specified by Locke—rights of
the personal ‘estate,’ or of person and property. The
protection of those rights is insecure in the state of nature,
and so the social contract is adopted to enhance their
protection. In political society, then, one of the central (and
necessary) functions of the state is to create a system for
protecting those rights;160 in our society, that function is
fulfilled by the institution of private law, and, in the case of
the protection of involuntary obligations, of tort law. 161 The
rights against the state enumerated in constitutions, on this
view, are essentially a beefed-up version of the private
rights in response to the more significant threat posed by
the government.162 It would therefore make no sense to take
the interests specified by those rights as the basis for tort
protections since it is already clear which interests tort
protects—those covered by the prepolitical rights—and
since those publically enumerated rights are more
159. For an example of such an argument, see Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights
Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1873, 1882 (2011).
160. This is an argument along the lines of Ripstein’s interesting series of
articles on the mutual requirements of prepolitical rights and public
institutions. See Ripstein, supra notes 28, 67; RIPSTEIN, supra note 73.
161. See Owen Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982) (discussing Fiss’s theory of adjudication).
162. I am grateful to Jeremy Waldron for pressing me to address this account.
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expansive precisely because of the difference between foxes
and polecats, to use Locke’s analogy for the differing threat
of individuals and states.
That argument is flawed in a variety of ways. First, as I
argued in the previous section, while there may be a
difference between the threat posed to certain individual
interests by the state and by some private individuals, other
private actors, such as large employers, quasi- or fully
monopolistic service providers, as well as highly powerful
actors in other domains, do present exactly the kind of
threat to those very same interests as the state.163 Second,
and more pertinent to my argument here, the idea that
prepolitical rights are somehow more determinate in their
content than any other type of posited or legal right is
simply false. One might agree with Locke that in the state
of nature we have certain moral rights, and yet reasonably
disagree with him about which rights those are, or what
their relative weight ought to be. Or one might agree that
rights of person and property are prepolitical but think that
under the circumstances of scarcity, or the circumstances of
justice, more broadly, the scope of those rights is morally
different than it would be under the conditions Locke
described. In fact, when we disagree about what rights we
ought to have, if we take those rights to be moral rights,
then we are disagreeing about prepolitical rights. In short,
then, if one assumes that the specific content of ‘prepolitical’
rights is determinate, one is making the same mistake as
the one made by economists when they make the
assumption that efficiency is a sufficiently justified social
goal to overcome the moral requirements arising from the
reality of disagreement.
Third, when comparing the interests protected by the
Lockean prepolitical rights with those protected by bills of
rights, one finds that the latter group protects what seem
like ‘social’ or contingent rights, such as various forms of
equality, welfare, and due process. Surely, one might say,
those rights can’t be construed as prepolitical, because they
are so contingent: they are at least partly the products of
historical inequalities perpetuated by political societies;
they cannot, therefore, be truly prepolitical in the requisite
sense, unlike rights of person and property, which do seem
163. For an argument about the moral implications of this phenomenon, see
PUBLIC RIGHTS, PRIVATE RELATIONS, supra note 62.
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uncontingent in the necessary way. But it is not at all clear
that moral rights in a ‘real’ state of nature would not protect
any interests that were systematically threatened by the
conditions under which people actually lived. If women, for
example, were routinely treated unequally in a state of
nature (as could easily be imagined), then the motivation for
recognizing their rights to the ‘personal estate’ would also,
at least arguably, extend to recognizing certain special
protections for their interests that are uniquely threatened.
One way of responding to that argument, in other words, is
to recognize that the kinds of interpersonal conditions that
motivate moral rights within the state might also motivate
them outside of it.
Another response, and my final objection to the
‘prepolitical rights’ basis for the justification of tort’s status
quo, is related, but would apply even if we assume
agreement about the content of the prepolitical rights. Just
as we could reasonably take prepolitical morality to protect
interests that fall outside the traditional physical-personand-property set within the state of nature, where certain
important interests are systematically threatened by social
conditions, we have even greater reason to make sure that
all of the institutions of the state are responsive to the
protection of those interests, just as they are to the
prepolitical ones. The institution of tort would thus be
subject to this requirement, just as any others would. And
we can quite reasonably interpret the rights enumerated
within bills of rights to be precisely the kind of interests
most widely taken to be both crucially important and thus
‘prepolitical’ at least in that sense, and to be threatened by
the very social conditions for which we are imagining the
institution of tort.
Finally, we find another form of this kind of
‘prepolitical’ argument in the idea that tort is justified
because it fulfills something like the “dispensation of
private justice.”164 But this kind of argument is vulnerable to
the same kinds of objections set out above, particularly in
respect of the fact of disagreement. What, in other words, is
private justice—who would determine the content of its
rights and obligations? If it were not assumed to simply be
164. See Calnan, supra note 106, at 1027 (making an argument in which the
moral requirements of the prepolitical are articulated as a “liberal theory” of
torts).
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the same thing as ‘prepolitical’ justice, how would it differ
from privatized justice such as Sharia?165 Private justice
could, in short, be pursued according to any system of
morality that allowed for a sphere of interpersonal norms.
But the system of justice that forms part of the basic
structure of liberal society cannot be animated by a
particular, comprehensive morality like that of Islam. Nor,
in fact, ought it to be animated by the comprehensive
morality of Kantian justice, if that morality is to be imposed
within the political sphere without proceeding through the
norms of a public decision procedure.
Another possible candidate reason for maintaining a
firmer conceptual separation between public values and
private law than the one I have been advocating is that the
‘private’ can be kept as a kind of ‘apolitical’ sphere. 166
Protecting a ‘neutral,’ ‘value-free’ zone strikes me as simply
implausible, and many others have argued extensively and
eloquently on this point, so I will not belabor it further. But
what about a special and distinctively private sphere—are
there uniquely private values? The most often cited
candidate here is something like personal neutrality167 (as
distinct from the legal neutrality espoused by legal
formalism)—on this view private law would delineate a
sphere in which one can pursue one’s conception of the good,
and not have the state’s values imposed on one’s
165. Lest one think this example far-fetched, see Noah Feldman’s excellent
and nuanced arguments about this kind of justice. Noah Feldman, Why
Shariah?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 46-51, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16Shariaht.html?pagewanted=all.
166. This idea underpins corrective justice theory to the extent that it takes
tort law to be an embodiment of the prioritization of the right over the good, and
to the extent that it embraces the idea that the substantive good is the domain
of the political while only the right is the proper purview of the legal. The idea is
that tort as a system of formal reasoning cannot, as Bruce Chapman puts it, “be
used systematically to achieve any particular goal of public policy or distributive
justice or, for that matter, any specific substantive good at all.” See Bruce
Chapman, Tort Law Reasoning and the Achievement of the Good, in TORT
THEORY 77 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993).
167. See generally Amnon Reichman, A Charter-Free Domain: In Defence of
Dolphin Delivery, 35 U.B.C. L. REV. 329 (2002) (making arguments for
distinctively private incarnations of the rights and wrongs at issue); see also
Reichman, supra note 7, at 245 (viewing tort as apolitical and institutionally
autonomous).
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interactions.168 The problem is that there is no way of
neutralizing the political and moral association of the set of
interests selected for protection by tort law, and tort law is
an institution of the state. If we select only the most
minimal interests—as seems to have been the case so far—a
comprehensive moral position has in fact been espoused.
But since tort law is the law of the state, and, on a positivist
view of the law, is thus an expression of political moral
commitments, what justifies the state’s adoption of a
Kantian moral outlook when it comes to the design of its
basic institutions?
A related proposal, and one I find more plausible, that
also embraces a certain kind of minimalism about the
interests tort should protect, involves personal privacy.
Freedom, in other words, not from the state’s value system
but from state interference: we shouldn’t be expanding the
grounds on which people can get into legal trouble—we
ought to try to minimize people’s legal liabilities. But
minimalism about legal liabilities is not the same as
justificatory minimalism;169 justificatory minimalism does
not require that we protect as few interests as possible.
Rather it requires that we protect only those interests that
are the most widely agreed upon in a given social setting, as
demonstrated through a super-majoritarian or constitutive
decision procedure. That way, at least, the values that will
be made the basis of interpersonal rights and obligations
will be very clear, and can be publically criticized.
B. Redundancy
The objection here is that we have other aspects of the
law that protect the interests reformists like myself am so
concerned about.170 There is, so this objection goes, already
human rights and civil rights legislation that protect these
interests, and so there is simply no need for tort to do so. On
its face this is a rather weak argument: the law addresses
many interests in a variety of ways—through criminal,
168. Id.
169. For a fuller explanation of a particular form of justificatory minimalism
see Joshua Cohen, Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope
For?, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 190 (2004).
170. I am grateful to Sam Issacharoff, Debra Satz, and participants in the
Stanford Political Theory Workshop for raising this set of objections helpfully.
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administrative, and regulatory laws—and this does not
mean that there is no normative role for each area.
Consider, for example, the interest in physical integrity,
which tort protects and which is already protected in
criminal law, administrative law, and environmental
regulation. Still, to the extent that this objection has
traction, one could call it the problem of overprotection.
Another objection along these lines might be that the
current tort system does protect this wider set of interests,
but that its characteristic mode of protecting them is
indirect: if these interests are set back by means of
infringements of person or property, then tort law does
address them. In this line of thinking, we might say that the
person and property limitation is a kind of seriousness
threshold that justifies coercive response. What is wrong
with this indirect mode of protection? Call this the objection
from indirect protection.
A final concern along these lines is as follows. If the
rights and obligations among individuals are understood to
protect the same panoply of interests as those articulated in
public law, there will be no reason to conceive of tort as an
independent legal category at all. If we are going to leave
open the question of which interests tort ought to protect,
then we have accepted that there are no protected interests
that tort necessarily involves by some sort of conceptual or
logical implication; the interests selected for protection are
selected by lawmakers—judicial or legislative.
One line of response to this kind of criticism is that tort
protects interests with a distinctive set of remedies not
available under criminal or civil rights law. Civil rights law
allows for much less in the way of punitive damages,
usually, than does tort; similarly it does not generally allow
for trial by juries, nor for specific tort mechanisms such as
vicarious liability, which can be an essential tool for
plaintiffs wronged by penniless defendants, and also for the
larger purpose of deterring conduct, such as discrimination,
that is socially as well as individually injurious.
But it seems to me that there are two much more
important reasons why tort ought to be conceptualized as a
distinctive legal category and a category of legal claims, and
these reasons are responsive to all three of the problems of
redundancy just outlined, insofar as they conceive of a
particular kind of normative role for tort that does not refer
to the distinctiveness of the interests it protects. These
reasons refer to two aspects of tort’s existing structure that
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I will claim are normatively valuable against the
background of the principles of liberal justice and of public
moral commitments to the set of constitutionally
enumerated fundamental rights. These involve tort’s
institutional capacity to address questions of the definition
and limitation of property rights on a case-by-case basis,
and its institutional structure of direct complaint and
compensation.
1. Integrating Proprietary and Nonproprietary Interests.
First, conceiving of tort as justifiable along the lines I have
suggested means that these interests found in constitutive
public moral commitments would have to be understood not
as secondary to, or somehow as side-constraints on
proprietary rights, but rather that both types of interests
would have to be conceptualized as partly and jointly
constitutive of the personal rights which individuals have.
In other words, freedoms such as conscience, association,
expression, and religion, and dimensions of social equality
such as race and gender would have to be taken not as
secondary limitations on innate property rights, but as part
of the normative consideration of what property is, what
justifies its protection and what defines its scope and
contours. If tort protects the interests set out in
constitutional commitments as its own, in the way I have
been suggesting, so that those interests are considered to be
as much ‘tort interests’ as are physical integrity, reputation,
and property, then a much more direct rights-balancing
would have to take place within all tort litigation.
So if a person simply put up a sign on their house that
indicated two doors, one for whites and one for blacks, then
even if other areas of the law would have the police
knocking on his door, my argument says that there is a
special role for tort to allow those whose interest in racial
equality was affected to bring a claim against the
homeowner. I am not saying that the claimant in such a
case ought to win, ought to be compensated or granted
injunctive relief against the homeowner, but only that, as a
matter of tort’s expressive political role, they be given a
claim to make in their own name, directly against the other
person, for the setback they experience to that very
important interest.
All these interests would then be conceived of as
dimensions of the person, of personal freedom, integrity and
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autonomy; the question of what is the fair outcome in a
given case would then require an explicit analysis of the
relative importance of these interests in a person’s life and
in the context at issue. Now, that kind of analysis would, of
course, itself require guidance from public values and public
debates. But conceiving of tort in this way would at least
generate the requirement that the public, and philosophers
of both political philosophy and private law, have such a
debate, and reform tort according to its outcomes.
2. Promoting Rights Subjectivity. But there is a second
reason to retain the legal distinctiveness of tort as a
category of claims, beyond the explicit recognition that
proprietary and nonproprietary interests are, as protected
personal interests, the same kind of thing. There is, in other
words, something properly, justifiably distinctive about tort
law that speaks against collapsing the protection of
individual interests against other individuals into other
branches of the law—criminal, administrative, and
constitutional—and cutting the cord to tort altogether.
There is something normatively distinctive about tort, such
that we might, as a way of designing an institution to enact
and enforce our involuntary interpersonal obligations, want
to keep it—that something refers back to the rightspromoting benefits of tort’s direct complaint and
compensation structure.
We have reason to conceive of and retain tort law as a
distinct category of causes of action—a category held
together not by the ‘integrity’ of the interests it protects,
since these ought to remain open, conceptually, to input
from public and constitutional deliberative sources, but by
its institutional structure of direct complaint and
compensation by individuals in their own names. This
structure, rather than the substantive set of interests
privileged by selection in tort’s status quo, has a distinctive
value for political society. This, then, along with the
fundamental commitment to pursuing social goals in
accordance with respect for individual rights, and with a
presumption in favor of conceiving of the person in terms of
the publically enumerated interests, is the third way in
which we ought to use our foundational political and legal
commitments to moral rights to inform our institutional
establishment of interpersonal rights and obligations. Even
when we recognize that tort ought, at least presumptively,
to include the interests enumerated as public law rights
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within its ambit of protection, tort’s distinctive role in the
legal, political, and social commitment to these rights still
lies in its institutional structure of direct complaint and
compensation.
We have made a moral commitment, through our
constitutional foundations, to the idea that individuals are,
in a fundamental sense, rights-bearing subjects, meaning
that they can and ought to be legally entitled to make legal
claims vindicating their rights on their own behalf, rather
than relying on some other party, such as the state, to do so.
Therefore, the interests specified by publically enacted bills
of rights by tort ought to be protected in a way that
recognizes and promotes the rights-subjectivity of
individuals, as well as the social commitment to that
subjectivity. It is in this respect that tort is, I argue,
institutionally well suited to the political commitment to
individual moral rights. Tort law’s properly distinctive
institutional feature within political society is its expressive
institutional capacity not only to further the vindication of
rights, but to foster active rights-subjectivity as a social and
political norm.
My argument has one major implication for reform of
tort law. Property and proprietary interests would still be
protected by tort—virtually all constitutions and human
rights instruments protect property in some way—but they
would be protected as one set of interests among others, and
the relationship among those interests would be
presumptively equal, so that the way in which interests,
such as racial equality, freedom of association, or privacy,
interact with people’s interest in the free use of their
property would be determined on a case-by-case basis. The
presumption in favor of the proprietary interests that we
currently find in tort would be abandoned: sometimes
people’s proprietary interests would outweigh other people’s
claims to its restriction, and sometimes tort would delineate
the contours of property rights with direct reference to those
other, nonproprietary ones.
What would this equality of interests achieve? One
effect would be expressive, in that proprietary and
nonproprietary interests would stand on an equal footing.
Take the case of sex equality. Many reformists argue that
what I am calling the nonproprietary interests, such as
antidiscrimination, or sex equality (as manifested in a cause
of sexual harassment) could give rise to tort actions under
the rubric of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
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distress. Now, that would be good, if it allowed those
interests to be protected in tort law in a way that they are
currently not. But my argument implies that it would be
better to create causes of tort actions that directly and
specifically express those interests, so that an action would
be brought for racial discrimination, for a particular kind of
sexual harassment, or for the restriction of free association.
The reason this follows from my argument is that it is an
inadequate reflection of the importance of our public moral
commitment to those interests to treat them as wrongful
because they cause emotional distress. Emotional
tranquility is not the same interest as racial equality,
sexual equality, or the freedom to associate. The expressive
dimension of tort, I want to claim, means that it is
inadequate to say that a pornographic calendar in a
workplace is legally problematic only as a matter of human
rights law, or as a matter of employment law, or as a matter
of the emotional tranquility of those offended by it.
Eliminating this distinctive tort right would, therefore,
deny victims a qualitatively distinct and important avenue
of legal redress. It is not clear why such redress should not
be open to victims of harm to their interests, such as racial
and gender equality, low-cost rescue, religion or expression.
Torts of this kind, for example, would allow for victims to
make normative claims against each other directly, and
violators would be forced to pay damages.
This response also addresses the objection from tort’s
indirect protection, and refers to tort’s expressive function
in political society: there is an expressive value in protecting
important interests directly. In response to the idea of
person and property interests as a kind of harm threshold, I
would suggest that it would be a somewhat peculiar
conception of harm to see a minor infringement of a
property boundary as more “serious” than a violation of one
of the basic freedoms.
This way of conceptualizing tort’s distinctiveness raises
a further consideration: if tort’s institutional structure of
direct complaint and compensation constitute its
institutional character, and make it independently
worthwhile as a mechanism for implementing interpersonal
involuntary obligations, does that structure impose any
constraints on the contents of the rights we might like tort
to protect? The answer to this question dovetails with the
final objection to the presumption in favor of publically

2013]WHICH INTERESTS SHOULD TORT PROTECT 79
enumerated interests, so I will address the two together in
the following section.
C. Overbreadth
The third objection is that the range of interests
protected in constitutionally enumerated rights is
hopelessly broad—tort could never actively protect them all
without imposing a massive burden on individual freedom.
This is a real concern, it seems to me, but it is mitigated
somewhat by the fact that constraints might be imposed on
tort’s substance—the interests it protects as rights—by the
interpretation of its institutional value I set out in the
previous section. In order to give a full account of the way
this kind of constraint would operate in practice, in the
weighing of interests in litigation, I would need much more
space than I have in this Article, so I cannot fully elaborate
this response here, but I will, in what follows, give a brief
outline of my early reasoning.
In general it seems to me that the structure of tort
claims precludes using tort to unfairly put one defendant on
the hook for a rights violation that has in fact been
committed by a more polycentric tortfeasor—such as the
political community more generally. This would limit the
extent to which tort could be used as a form of localized
distributive justice, but it would not limit the types of rights
that could be enforced through tort. The only restriction is
that the rights violation must be shown to have been
committed by the defendant. The scope of tort claims is thus
limited through agent-relativity. This can be accomplished
by a determination that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty of care in respect of the relevant right. What goes into
making this determination, in the context of the
interpretation of tort I am proposing here, is beyond the
scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the kind of
connection between individuals that ordinarily grounds a
finding of a duty relationship in tort law would be
discernible in respect of the kinds of risks to interests such
as nondiscrimination, or religious freedom, just as it is in
the context of risks of physical harm.
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CONCLUSION
What does it mean for tort to be understood as
protecting rights? In this view, tort tells people how they
ought to behave in certain contexts. One implication of this
is that it would be wrong for people (or judges) to deliberate
about actions that might harm others through cost-benefit
calculations. So, for instance, it would be unacceptable to
purchase freedom to inflict losses, as one might do if we
accept the economists’ interpretation of what tort is doing,
where the burden of precaution is greater than the loss, so
that it is acceptable for you to simply calculate that it is
cheaper for a defendant just to pay for the resulting injury.
Put more abstractly, the implication of the rights element of
the interpretation of tort is that the system cannot be boiled
down to a welfare maximization function. We may protect
interests as aspects of welfare, but we do so within the
constraining function of rights’ orientation toward
individuals, and their moral agency and separateness.
Taking a view of tort that understands the content of
the rights it protects to be morally important interests
implies that these rights are not absolute; that tort will
retain its balancing function, weighing interests on a caseby-case basis.171 I suggest that we look to public moral
commitments to protecting enumerated interests that have
been deemed to be valuable (such as the fundamental rights
articulated in bills of rights). Designing the content of tort
rights this way would privilege particular aspects of
welfare, or the interpretation of what interests constitute or
generate welfare. This privileging, though, is justified
because the interests in question have been determined to
be morally important by carefully designed, transparent
and publically accountable decision procedures, as opposed
to the moral intuitions of judges.

171. As suggested by Joseph Raz in his definition of rights. See RAZ, supra note
59, at 166.

